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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we study ability peer effects in secondary schools in England and identify which segments
of the peer ability distribution drive the impact of peer quality on students￿ achievements. To do so,
we use census data for four cohorts of pupils taking their age-14 national tests, and measure students￿
ability by their prior achievements at age-11. We employ a new identification strategy based on within-pupil
regressions that exploit variation in achievements across the three compulsory subjects (English, Mathematics
and Science) tested both at age-14 and age-11. We find significant and sizeable negative peer effects
arising from bad peers at the very bottom of the ability distribution, but little evidence that average
peer quality and very good peers significantly affect pupils￿ academic achievements. However, these
results mask some significant heterogeneity along the gender dimension, with girls significantly benefiting
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1.  Introduction 
The estimation of peer effects in the classroom and at school has received intense attention in recent 
years. Several studies have presented convincing evidence about race, gender and immigrants‟ peer 
effects
1,  but  important  questions  about  ability  peer  effects  in  schools  remain  open,  with  little 
conclusive evidence.
2 In this paper we study ability peer effects in educational outcomes between 
schoolmates in secondary schools in England. Our aims are both to investigate the size of ability peer 
effects on the outcomes of secondary school students and to explore which segments of the ability 
distribution of peers drive the impact of peer quality on pupils‟ achievements. In particular, we study 
whether the extreme tails of the ability distribution of peers – namely the exceptionally low- and high-
achievers – as opposed to the average peer quality drive any significant ability peer effect on the 
outcomes of other students. 
To do so, we use data for all secondary schools in England for four cohorts of age-14 (9
th grade) 
pupils entering secondary school in the academic years 2001/2002 to 2004/2005 and taking their age-
14  national  tests  in  2003/2004-2006/2007.  We  link  this  information  to  data  on  pupils‟  prior 
achievement at age-11, when they took their end-of-primary education national tests, which we exploit 
to obtain pre-determined measures of peer ability in secondary schools. In particular, we construct 
measures of average peer quality based on pupils‟ age-11 achievements, as well as proxies for the very 
high- and very low-achievers, obtained by identifying pupils who are in the highest or lowest 5% of 
the (cohort-specific) national distribution of cognitive achievement at age-11. The way in which we 
measure peer ability is a major improvement over previous studies. The majority of previous empirical 
evidence on ability peer effects in schools comes from studies that examine the effect of average 
background characteristics, such as parental schooling, race and ethnicity on students‟ outcomes (e.g. 
Hoxby, 2000 for the US, and Ammermueller and Pischke, 2009 for several European countries). A 
limitation of these studies is that they do not directly measure the academic ability of students‟ peers, 
but rely on socio-economic background characteristics as proxies for this. Additionally, our measures 
of peer quality are immune to refection problems (Manski, 1993) for two reasons. First, we identify 
peers‟ quality based on pupils‟ test scores at the end of primary education, before students have to 
change school and make a compulsory transition to the secondary phase. As a consequence of the 
large reshuffling of pupils in England during this transition, on average students meet more than 80% 
new peers at secondary school, i.e. students that do not come from the same primary. Secondly, we are 
able to track pupils during this transition, which means that we can single out new peers from old 
peers, and construct peer quality measures separately for these two groups.  In these respects, our 
strategy follows Gibbons and Telhaj (2008), also on English secondary schools. In our analysis, we 
                                                 
1 See Angrist and Lang (2004) on peer effects through racial integration; Hoxby (2000) and Lavy and Schlosser 
(2011) on gender peer effects; and Gould et al. (2009) on the effect of immigrants on native students. 
2 Some exceptions are Sacerdote (2001) on ability peer effects among randomly paired roommates in university 
housing, and Carrell et al. (2009) on peer effects in squadrons at the US Air Force Academy.  
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focus on the effect of new peers‟ ability on pupil achievement (controlling for old peers‟ quality), thus 
by-passing reflection problems.
3  
Our results show that a large fraction of „bad‟ peers at school as identified by students in the 
bottom 5% of the ability distribution negatively and significantly affect the cognitive performance of 
other schoolmates. Importantly, we find that it is only the very bottom 5% students that (negatively) 
matter, and not „bad‟ peers in other parts of the ability distribution. On the other hand, we uncover 
little evidence that the average peer quality and the share of very „good‟ peers as identified by students 
in the top 5% of the ability distribution affect the educational outcomes of other pupils. However, 
these findings mask some marked heterogeneity along the gender dimension. Indeed, we show that 
girls,  especially  those  in  the  bottom  half  of  the  ability  distribution,  significantly  benefit  from 
interactions with very bright peers. In contrast, boys are marginally negatively affected by a larger 
proportion of academically outstanding peers at school. On the other hand, the negative effect of the 
very weak students does not significantly vary by the ability of regular students, nor along the gender 
dimension,  and  the  effect  of  the  average  peer  quality  is  estimated  to  be  zero  for  boys  and  girls 
irrespective of their ability. Although we cannot pin down the exact mechanisms that give rise to these 
effects, we rationalize our findings by drawing on theoretical explanations and related evidence in the 
economics literature (e.g. Lazear, 2001; Hoxby and Weingarth, 2005; Jackson, 2009), as well as in the 
psychological and educational research (e.g. Cross and Madson, 1997; Eagly, 1978; Marsh, 2005).  
Besides providing some novel insights about the nature of ability peer effects, our paper presents 
a new identification approach that allows us to improve on the (non-experimental) literature in the 
field and to identify the effects of peers‟ ability while minimizing biases due to endogenous selection 
and sorting of pupils, or omitted variables issues. Indeed, the distribution of pupils‟ characteristics in 
secondary schools in England, like in many other countries, reflects a high degree of sorting by ability. 
Using pupils‟ age-11 nationally standardized test scores as an indicator of ability we find that the 
average ability of peers and a pupil‟s own ability in secondary school are highly correlated. This is so 
despite the fact that most students have to change school when moving from primary to secondary 
education  and  that  on  average  pupils  meet  more  than  80%  new  peers.  Similarly,  there  is  a  high 
correlation  between  pupils‟  and  their  peers‟  socioeconomic  background  characteristics,  which  is 
further evidence of sorting. More surprisingly, these correlations survive even when we look at the 
within-secondary-school variation over time of pupils‟ and their peers‟ ability and characteristic – i.e. 
conditional on secondary school fixed-effects.
4 This suggests that sorting/selection might be taking 
place  with  pupils  and  schools  being  affected  by  and/or  responding  to  cohort-specific  unobserved 
shocks to students‟ and schools‟ quality. Identification strategies that rely on the randomness of peers‟ 
quality variation within-schools over time find little justification against this background. 
                                                 
3 Note that this does not imply that we are able to separate endogenous from exogenous peer effects (see Manksi, 
1993; Moffitt, 2001). We see this as a further and  separate issue from reflection problems  that arise from 
previous/simultaneous interactions among students that affect measures of peers‟ ability (Sacerdote, 2001). 
4 A similar result is documented by Gibbons and Telhaj (2008) and Black et al. (2009).  
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In  order  to  overcome  this  selection  problem,  we  rely  on  within-pupil  regressions  –  i.e.  on 
specifications including pupil fixed-effects – and exploit variation in achievements across the three 
compulsory subjects (English, Mathematics and Science) tested at age-14. We further exploit the fact 
that students were tested on the same three subjects at age-11 at the end of primary schools, so that we 
can measure peers‟ ability separately by subject. We then study whether subject-to-subject variation in 
outcomes for the same student is systematically associated with the subject-to-subject variation in 
peers‟ ability. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to use pupil fixed-effects and inter-subject 
differences in achievement to address identification issues of peer effects in schools. 
One significant advantage of this approach is that by including pupil fixed-effects we are able to 
control for pupil own unobservable average ability across the three subjects, as well as for unmeasured 
family background influences. Additionally, we can partial out in a highly flexible way school-by-
cohort  fixed-effects  and  other  more  general  cohort-specific  unobserved  shocks  that  might  affect 
pupils‟ outcomes and peers‟ quality similarly across the three subjects. These include unobserved 
changes in school resources or head teachers, year-on-year variation in the student body‟s composition 
(e.g. the fraction of pupils from poor family background), as well as changes in the quality of primary 
schooling  or  childcare  facilities.  Given  the  evidence  of  year-on-year  secondary  school  sorting 
highlighted above, controlling for these aspects seems particularly important.  
On the other hand, one potential threat to our identification strategy is the possibility that sorting 
occurs along the lines of subject-specific abilities, so that within-student across-subject variation in 
ability is correlated with the variation in peers‟ ability across subjects. However, as we shall see 
below,  there  is  neither  a  sizeable  nor  a  significant  correlation  between  the  within-student  across-
subject variation in age-11 achievements – i.e. our measure for students‟ subject-specific academic 
ability – and the variation in peers‟ ability across subjects. Moreover, conditional on pupil fixed-
effects, our results are virtually identical irrespective of whether or not we control for pupils‟ own age-
11 test scores. Stated differently, specifications that include pupil fixed-effects effectively take care of 
the sorting of pupils and their peers into secondary education, and provide reliable causal estimates of 
ability peer effects. To further support this claim, we provide an extensive battery of robustness checks 
to our core analysis. These include a set of regressions that focus on a sub-set of pupils with limited 
school choice from their place of residence, as well as results coming from specifications that further 
include school-by-subject effects to control for unobservable subject-specific school attributes. This 
additional evidence lends strong support to the causal interpretation of our results. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the literature on peer 
effects,  while  Section  3  presents  our  identification  strategy.  Section  4  describes  the  institutional 
background and our dataset. Section 5 reports our main estimates and robustness checks, while Section 
6 presents some heterogeneity in our findings. Finally, Section 7 provides some concluding remarks.  
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2.  Related literature 
For a long time social scientists have been interested in understanding and measuring the effects of 
peers‟ behavior and characteristics on individual outcomes, both empirically (e.g. Coleman, 1966) and 
theoretically (e.g. Becker, 1974). The basic idea is that group actions or attributes might influence 
individual  decisions  and  outcomes,  such  as  educational  attainment.  Despite  its  intuitiveness,  the 
estimation of peer effects is fraught with difficulties and many of the related identification issues have 
yet to find a definitive answer. In particular, Manski (1993) highlights the perils of endogenous group 
selection  and  the  difficulty  of  distinguishing  between  contextual  and  endogenous  peer  effects.  In 
practice, most studies have ignored this distinction and focused on reduced form estimation as outlined 
by Moffit (2001). Even then, the literature has had to by-pass a variety of biases that arise because of 
endogenous sorting or omitted variables and has not yet reached a consensus regarding the size and 
importance even of these reduced form effects.  
Two main issues have taxed researchers interested in the identification of the causal effect of peer 
quality in education. Firstly, it is widely recognized that a pupil‟s peer group is evidently self-selected 
and hence the quality of peers is not exogenous to a student‟s own quality and characteristics.
5 Failing 
to  control  for  all  observable  and  unobservable  factors  that  determine  individual  sorting  and 
achievements would result in biased estimates of peer effects. Secondly, peer effects work in both 
directions, so that peer achievements are endogenous to one pupils‟ own quality if students have been 
together for a while. This mechanical issue, known as the „reflection problem‟, is particularly difficult 
to undo unless the researcher is able to reshuffle group formation and belonging, and measure peers‟ 
quality in ways that are predetermined to interactions within the group. 
To account for these difficulties, recent years have seen a variety of identification strategies. 
Different  studies  have  exploited  random  group  assignments  (Sacerdote,  2001;  Zimmerman,  2003; 
Duflo et al., 2008; Carrell et al., 2009; De Giorgi et al., 2009; Gould et al., forthcoming), within-
school random variation (Hoxby, 2000; Hanushek et al., 2003; Ammermueller and Pischke, 2009; 
Gould et al, 2009; Lavy and Schlosser, 2011), instrumental variables (Goux and Maurin, 2007) or sub-
group  re-assignments  (Katz  et  al.,  2001;  Sanbonmatsu  et  al.,  2006).
6  Only  recently,  Lavy  et  al. 
(forthcoming) and Duflo et al. (2008) have tried to enter the „black box‟ of ability peer effects in Israel 
and Kenya, respectively, and have explicitly focused on understanding the mechanisms through which 
interactions  could  exert  their  effects.  Duflo  et  al.  (2008)  exploit  random  assignment  of  pupils  in 
primary schools in Kenya to classes by ability in order to identify peer effects. The authors find 
improvements from ability-tracking in primary schools and attribute this result to the fact that more 
homogeneous groups of students might be taught more effectively. Lavy et al. (forthcoming) present 
                                                 
5 There is a well established literature on the link between school quality and house prices (e.g. Black, 1999; 
Gibbons et al., 2009; Kane et al., 2006), suggesting that pupils are segregated into different neighborhoods and 
schools by socio-economic status. 
6 Other examples include Aizer (2008), Bifulco et al. (2008), Burke and Sass (2008), Figlio (2007), Lefgren 
(2004), Nechyba and Vidgor (2007) and Vidgor and Nechyba (2004).  
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related evidence of significant negative effects of a high fraction of low ability students in the class on 
the outcomes of other pupils, which might arise through classroom disruption and decrease in attention 
paid by the teacher.  
The study that is closest to ours in terms of context and data is Gibbons and Telhaj (2008) who 
also estimate peer effects for pupils in English secondary schools. The authors attempt to control for 
the endogenous sorting of pupils to secondary schools by allowing for primary and secondary school 
fixed-effect interactions and trends. However, this approach does not fully eliminate the correlation 
between pupils‟ own ability and peer quality, and their results provide little evidence of sizeable and 
significant peer effects.  
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first one to rely on pupil fixed-effects and inter-
subject differences in achievement to address identification issues of peer effects in schools. A similar 
approach has been previously used in Lavy (2009) to investigate the effect of instructional time on 
academic achievements; Bandiera et al. (2009) to study class size effects at university; and Dee (2007) 
to study the effect of teacher gender on students‟ attainments.  As already mentioned, the within-
student  approach  allows  to  control  for  pupil  unobservable  average  ability,  unmeasured  family 
background influences, school-by-cohort fixed-effects and other more general cohort-specific shocks 
that are common to the three subjects. We believe this approach achieves a clean identification of the 
causal effect of peers‟ ability. The next section spells out in detail our empirical strategy. 
3.  Empirical strategy 
3.1.  General identification strategy: within-pupil regressions 
The main problem with identifying the effect of the ability composition of peers on pupil educational 
achievements  is  that  peer  quality  measures  are  usually  confounded  by  the  effects  of  unobserved 
correlated factors that affect students‟ outcomes. This correlation could arise if there is selection and 
sorting of students across schools based on ability differences, or if there is a relation between average 
students‟ ability in one school and other characteristics of that school, potentially not fully observed. 
The approach commonly used in several recent studies relies on within-school variations in the ability 
distribution of students across adjacent cohorts or across different classes (e.g. Ammermueller and 
Pischke, 2009; Hoxby, 2000; Gibbons and Telhaj, 2008; Lavy et al., forthcoming; Lavy and Schlosser, 
2011). This method potentially avoids both sources of confounding factors, although the identifying 
assumption  is  that  the  variation  of  peer  quality  over  time  or  across  classes  is  idiosyncratic  and 
uncorrelated with students‟ potential outcomes and background.  
In  this  paper,  we  suggest  an  alternative  approach  for  overcoming  the  potential  sorting  and 
omitted variable biases, namely we examine subject-to-subject variation in outcomes for the same 
student  and  investigate  if  this  is  systematically  associated  with  the  subject-to-subject  variation  in 
peers‟ ability. Stated differently, we study whether pupils who have school peers that have higher  
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ability  in  subject  j  (e.g.  Mathematics)  than  in  subject  i  (e.g.  Science),  have  better  cognitive 
performance in subject j than in subject i.  
More formally, using test scores in multiple subjects and four cohorts of 9
th graders taking their 
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Where i denotes pupils, q denotes subjects (English, Mathematics and Science), s denotes schools and 
t denotes pupils‟ cohort.  iqst A  is an achievement measure for student i in subject q at school s in cohort 
t. In our analysis, we focus on test scores in the three compulsory subjects (English, Mathematics and 
Science) assessed at age-14 during the national tests; these are denoted in England as Key Stage 3 
(KS3; more details in Section 4). Additionally, 
i   is a student fixed-effect,  q   is a subject-specific 
effect, and st   is a school × cohort effect. We also include an interaction term between pupil gender 
and subject-specific effects which is meant to control for the well-documented gender disparities in 
achievements  in  different  subjects  (see  Ellison  and  Swanson,  2009,  and  Fryer  and  Levitt, 
forthcoming),  and  their  potential  effect  on  pupils‟  sorting  into  secondary  schooling.
7  Next,  qst P  
captures the average ability of peers in subject q in secondary school s in cohort t as measured by test 
scores in a given subject in the national tests taken by students at age-11 at the end of primary school 
(denoted as Key Stage 2, or KS2). On the other hand, 
h
qst P  and 
l
qst P  capture the fraction of very high-
ability and the very low-ability peers in one students‟ cohort. More precisely, we choose the top and 
bottom 5% in the (cohort-specific) national distribution of KS2 test scores as the cut off points to 
determine 
h
qst P  and 
l
qst P  (this cut-off choice is not arbitrary; more details in the data and results 
sections). Finally,  iqst   is an error term that allows for any type of correlation within observations of 
the same student and of the same school.  
The coefficients of interest are  1  , which captures the effect of the average ability of peers on 
students‟ achievement; and  2   and  3  , which respectively measure the effect of the proportion of 
peers in the cohort who are in the top 5% and bottom 5% of the national distribution of KS2 test 
scores.  As  discussed  above,  we  are  interested  in  both  the  absolute  and  the  relative  strength  and 
significance of these three coefficients to determine which segments of the peer ability distribution 
drive any ability peer effect that we will document. 
Note that one significant advantage of this approach is that pupil fixed-effects „absorb‟ students‟ 
own unobservable average ability across subjects and unmeasured family background characteristics. 
                                                 
7 We also tried specifications where we interact other pupil characteristics (e.g. eligibility for free school meals) 
with subject-specific dummies and found virtually identical results. However, we prefer the more parsimonious 
specification in Equation (1).  
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Moreover, this specification allows to partial out in a very flexible way school-by-cohort fixed-effects, 
such as unobserved changes in school resources or head teachers and year-on-year variation in the 
student body‟s composition (e.g. the proportion of students eligible for free school meals), as well as 
other cohort-specific unobserved shocks (e.g. changes in the quality of primary schooling or childcare 
facilities)  that  affect  pupils‟  outcomes  and  peers‟  quality  similarly  across  the  three subjects.  This 
seems particularly important given the issues discussed in Arcidiacono et al. (2009) and the evidence 
discussed in the Introduction of a significant correlation between pupils‟ characteristics and ability and 
the characteristics and ability of their peers even conditional on secondary school fixed-effects.  
Before moving on, two remarks are worth being made. First, one necessary assumption for our 
identification strategy is that peer effects are the same for all three subjects; stated differently, we 
cannot interact the   parameters with  q   in Equation (1). Although this restriction does not seem 
untenable, in the analysis that follows we will provide evidence to support this conjecture. Second, our 
peer effects are „net‟ measures of peer influences, that is net of ability spillovers across subjects (e.g. 
peers‟ ability in English might influence pupils‟ test scores in Mathematics). If spillovers are very 
strong such that subject-specific abilities do not matter, then we are bound to find zero peer effects. 
3.2.  Dealing with potential threats to identification 
Although the strategy described so far allows us to control for pupils‟ average ability across subjects, 
one concern is the possibility that sorting of students in different schools is partly based on subject-
specific ability and considerations. In particular, there might be some residual correlation between the 
within-student  across-subject  variation  in  age-11  prior  achievements,  capturing  students‟  subject-
specific abilities, and the variation in peers‟ quality across subjects.  
Our first approach to account for such residual sorting is to control for pupils‟ KS2 test scores in 
the within-pupil estimation. The underlying assumption is that lagged test scores effectively capture 
any subject-specific abilities and there is no sorting based on unobserved factors that are not correlated 
with KS2 scores, so that within-subject peer assignment is as good as random conditional on primary 
school test scores. To our advantage, we can control for lagged test scores in a very flexible way by 
including in our specification at the same time same-subject lagged test scores (e.g. looking at age-14 
English test score for pupil i controlling for age-11 English achievement), as well as cross-subject test 
scores  (e.g.  looking  at  pupil  i‟s  age-14  English  test  score  controlling  for  age-11  attainments  in 
Mathematics and Science). This allows to partial out the effect of one pupil‟s own ability in a specific 
subject, as well as cross-subject effects. Additionally, we can interact lagged test scores with subject-
specific  dummies,  so  that  age-11  achievements  exhibit  different  effects  on  age-14  outcomes  in 
different  subjects.  Under  our  most  flexible  and  preferred  specification,  we estimate  the  following 
model: 
1 1 ( 1) 1 ( 2) 1
hl
iqst i q st q qst qst qst q iqst q iq st q iq st iqst A Gender P P P a a a                               (2)  
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where  1 iqst a   represents same-subject lagged test scores,  ( 1) 1 iq st a   and  ( 2) 1 iq st a  are the two cross-
subjects lagged test scores, and  q  ,  q   and  q   are subject-specific parameters that capture the effects 
of lagged test scores in the same- and cross-subjects.
8  
Anticipating our analysis below, we find that results from within-pupil specifications are virtually 
identical whether or not we control for pupils‟ own age-11 test scores. This is explained by the fact 
that – as revealed by the placebo-type test carried out in Table 3 – there is neither a sizeable nor a 
significant correlation between the within-student across-subject variation in prior achievements, and 
the variation in peers‟ ability across subjects. Stated differently, conditional on pupil fixed-effects, 
peers‟ subject-specific quality measures are balanced with respect to pupils‟ own age-11 test scores, 
and specifications that include pupil fixed-effects effectively take care of the sorting of pupils and 
their peers into secondary education. Nonetheless, we complement our core strategy with a set of 
robustness checks to assess the importance of subject-specific sorting. In particular, we restrict our 
analysis to a sub-set of pupils with limited school choice from their place of residence and for whom 
concerns about subject-specific considerations are mitigated. Even among these students, our findings 
hold completely unaffected. 
A second source of concern is that, although the pupil fixed-effects strategy accounts for school-
by-cohort unobserved shocks, it does not control for subject-specific school unobservables. This raises 
questions  as  to  whether  differences  in  pupils‟  attainments  across  subjects  are  driven  by  subject-
specific differences in their peers‟ quality, or related to other factors such as school specialism in one 
area of the curriculum or teachers‟ subject-specific abilities.
9 In order to minimize these concerns, we 
exclude  from  our  sample  schools  with  a  stated  „specialism‟  in  a  given  subject.  About  8.5%  of 
secondary school students in England attend a specialist school, and some common areas of specialism 
include: language; mathematics and computing; science; technology; business and enterprise; and arts. 
Additionally, in some of our specifications we include school-by-subject fixed-effects – on top of 
pupil fixed-effects – to control for subject-specific school unobservables that are persistent over time. 
As detailed in the results section, these empirical models are very demanding in terms of the variation 
they exploit to identify the effects of peers‟ quality. Nevertheless, results from these specifications 
provide full support to the causal interpretation of our estimates. 
3.3.  Measuring peers’ ability 
A key requirement for our empirical approach is that the proxies of peer ability are based on pre-
determined measures of students‟ ability that have not been affected by the quality of his/her peers and 
do not suffer from reflection problems. The longitudinal structure of the data that we use allows us to 
                                                 
8 Note that conditional on pupil fixed-effects, the same-subject and two cross-subjects lagged test scores cannot 
be simultaneously identified. Therefore, in our within-pupil empirical specification, we only include the same-
subject lagged test score and one of the two cross-subject lagged outcomes.  
9 Carrell and West (2010) highlight the importance of teacher quality for university students‟ attainments.  
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link  peers‟  age-11  test  scores  taken  at  the  end  of  primary  school  (6
th  grade)  to  students‟  age-14 
achievements four years later (9
th grade) in secondary school. Additionally, by following individuals 
over time, we are able to point out which secondary school students come from the same primary and 
identify who the new peers and the old peers are. In the national sample, on average 87% of pupil i‟s 
peers at secondary school did not attend the same primary institution as student i, and therefore their 
age-11 test scores could not have been affected by this pupil. Following Gibbons and Telhaj (2008), in 
our analysis, we construct peer quality measures separately for new peers and old peers, and focus on 
the effect of new peers on pupil achievement. Nevertheless, we include measures of the quality of old 
peers in our empirical specifications to control for primary-school × cohort × subject effects that might 
persist on age-14 test scores and that are shared by pupils coming from the same primary school and 
cohort. Note that our estimates are not sensitive to the inclusion of these variables. 
Two additional remarks are worth being made. First, we use information about the school that a 
pupil is attending at age-12 (7
th grade), when he/she enters secondary education, to define our base 
population. Similarly our three measures of peer quality „treatment‟ (the „good‟, the „bad‟ and the 
average peer quality) are based on 7
th-grade enrollment. This is because any later definition of these 
proxies, for example as recorded at age 14, might be endogenous.  
Second, in implementing this methodology, we use peers‟ ability measured at the grade and not 
at  the  class  level  because  our  data  does  not  include  class  identifiers.  We  do  not  see  this  as  a 
particularly restrictive compromise since the majority of schools do not strictly group pupils with 
different  subject-specific  abilities  into different  classes  at  the  early  stages  of  secondary  education 
(more details in the next section). Therefore, the quality of peers within a grade is likely to be strongly 
correlated with the quality of peers within classes. However, if a significant degree of subject-specific 
tracking  takes  place,  grade-level  peer  quality  measures  might  capture  the  peer  quality  actually 
experienced by pupils with some noise, thus leading to downward-biased estimates of the effect of 
peers‟ ability.
10 To minimize these issues, our main analysis focuses on the 50% smallest secondary 
schools in England, with a maximum grade-7 cohort-size of 180 students, and 135 7
th grade-students 
on average. Small schools will have fewer classes since they receive funding based on pupil numbers 
and have clear incentives to run classes at maximum capacity (approximately 30/35 students). This 
implies that students will be more mixed with peers of heterogeneous abilities in small schools than in 
larger ones, where more classes can be created to group students according to their abilities. However, 
to further assess the importance of these issues, we will investigate whether our results change when 
we focus on a sub-set of even smaller secondary schools (average cohort size 120), as opposed to all 
schools in England irrespective of their size.  
                                                 
10 Note however that even having access to information about class identifiers would not solve this issue if 
students can choose their networks – and thus their peers – within classes or outside of these. On the other hand, 
our study does not suffer from measurement error due to incomplete information on pupils‟ schoolmates as in 
Ammermueller and Pischke (2009).  
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4.  Institutions, data and descriptive statistics 
4.1.   Schooling in England: institutional background 
Compulsory education  in England  is  organized into  five stages  referred  to as Key Stages.  In  the 
primary phase, pupils enter school at age 4-5 in the Foundation Stage, then move on to Key Stage 1 
(KS1), spanning ages 5-6 and 6-7 (corresponding to 1
st and 2
nd grade in the US educational system). 
At age 7-8 pupils move to KS2, sometimes – but not usually – with a change of school. At the end of 
KS2, when they are 10-11 (6
th grade), children leave the primary phase and go on to secondary school 
where they progress through KS3 (7
th to 9
th grade) and KS4 (10
th to 12
th grade). Importantly, the vast 
majority of pupils have to change schools on transition from primary to secondary education, and 
move on to the school of their choice. 
Indeed, since the Education Reform Act of 1988, the „choice model‟ of school provision has been 
progressively  extended  in  the  state-school  system  in  England  (Glennerster,  1991).  In  this  setting, 
pupils can attend any under-subscribed school regardless of where they live and parental preference is 
the  deciding  factor.  All  Local  Education  Authorities  (LEAs)  and  schools  must  organize  their 
admissions arrangements in accordance with the current statutory Governmental Admissions Code of 
Practice.  The  guiding  principle  of  this  document  is  that  parental  choice  should  be  the  first 
consideration when ranking applications to schools. However, if the number of applicants exceeds the 
number of available places, other criteria which are not discriminatory, do not involve selection by 
ability and can be clearly assessed by parents, can be used to prioritize applicants. These vary in detail, 
but preference is usually given first to children with special educational needs, next to children with 
siblings in the school and to those children who live closest. For Faith schools, regular attendance at 
designated churches or other expressions of religious commitment is foremost. As a result, although 
choice is the guiding principle that schools should use to rank applications, it has long been suspected 
that schools have some leeway to pursue some forms of covert selection based on parental and pupil 
characteristics that are correlated with pupil ability (see West and Hind, 2003). 
As for testing, at the end of each Key Stage, generally in May, pupils are assessed on the basis of 
standard national tests (SATS), and progress through the phases is measured in terms of Key Stage 
Levels, ranging between W („Working towards Level 1‟) up to Level 5+ during primary education and 
Level 7 at KS3. Importantly, at both KS2 and KS3 students are tested in three core subjects, namely 
Mathematics, Science and English, and their attainments are recorded in terms of the raw test scores, 
spanning the range 0-100, from which the Key Stage Levels are derived. We will use these test scores 
to measure pupils‟ attainments at KS3 and identify peers‟ quality as measured by their KS2.  
Finally, regarding the organization of teaching and class formation, two important issues are 
worth mentioning. First, the notion of „class‟ is a rather hollow one in English secondary schools since 
students are grouped with different pupils for different subjects. A second important aspect that – at 
least nominally – characterizes English secondary education is the practice of „ability setting‟, i.e. 
subject-specific tracking. Under these arrangements, secondary school pupils are initially taught in  
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mixed-ability  groups  for  an  observation  and  acclimatization  period  of  around  a  year,  and  then 
eventually educated in different groups for different subjects according to their aptitude in that topic.
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However, despite some support from the central Government, the practice of ability setting is not liked 
nor supported by teachers, and as a result has not been fully adopted by secondary schools. Data 
collected by the Office for Standards in Education (OFSTED) in 2001-2002 from inspection of 566 
secondary schools (cited in Kutnick et al., 2006) shows that only about 26% of these had subject-
specific setting from 7
th grade, with the percentage increasing to around 40% in 9
th grade. Further 
evidence is provided by Kutnick et al. (2006), who gathered data for a small set of medium-to-large 
sized secondary schools with on average around 200 students in grade 7. This study shows that only 
around 50% of the schools had ability sets for Mathematics from 7
th grade, with the figures being 
substantially lower for English and Science, respectively at 34% and 44%. Although these numbers 
increase  as  students  reach  9
th  grade,  subject-specific  setting  remains  far  from  universal,  with  the 
figures being 46%, 59% and 80% in English, Science and Mathematics respectively. In conclusion, 
two features emerge from this discussion. First, because of the lack of clearly defined and stable 
classes  during  secondary  education,  students  will  predominantly  interact  with  different  peers  in 
different subjects. Second, since ability setting is not strictly implemented, pupils will face a variety of 
class-mates with a heterogeneous range of abilities during instruction time even for the same subject. 
Finally, recall that our analysis focuses on the 50% smallest secondary schools in England – with on 
average 65 pupils (i.e. two classes) less than those sampled by Kutnick et al. (2006). This further 
minimizing issues due to subject-specific ability setting. 
4.2.  Data construction 
The UK‟s Department for Children, Schools and Families (DCSF) collects a variety of data on all 
pupils and all schools in state education.
12 This is because the pupil assessment system is used to 
publish school performance tables and information on pupil numbers and pupil/school characteristics 
is necessary for administrative purposes – in particular to determine funding. Starting from 1996, a 
database  exists  holding  information  on  each  pupil‟s  assessment  record  in  the  Key  Stage  SATS 
described above throughout their school career. Additionally, from 2002 the DCSF has carried out the 
Pupil  Level  Annual  School  Census  (PLASC),  which  records  information  on  pupil‟s  gender,  age, 
ethnicity,  language  skills,  any  special  educational  needs  or  disabilities,  entitlement  to  free  school 
meals and various other pieces of information, including the identity of the school attended during 
years other than those when pupils sit for their Key Stage tests. PLASC is integrated with the pupil‟s 
assessment records in the National Pupil Database (NPD), giving a large and detailed dataset on pupil 
                                                 
11 Subject-specific ability is often gauged using end-of-primary education KS2 test scores. However, these are 
only available to schools several months after they have admitted pupils and teachers have some discretion in 
determining the ability set that is most appropriate for their students in different subjects (see DfES, 2006). 
12 The private sector has a market share of about 6-7%. However, very little consistent information exists for 
pupils and schools in the private domain. For this reason, we do not consider private schooling in our analysis.  
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characteristics, along with their test histories. Furthermore, various other data sources can be merged 
in at school level using the DCSF Edubase and Annual School Census, which contain details on 
school  institutional  characteristics  (e.g.  religious  affiliation),  demographics  of  the  students  (e.g. 
fractions of pupils eligible for free school meals) and size (e.g. number of pupils on roll). 
The length of the time series in the data means that it is possible to follow the academic careers 
of four cohorts of children from age-11 (6
th grade) through to age-14 (9
th grade), and to join this 
information to PLASC data for every year of secondary schooling (7
th to 9
th grade). The four cohorts 
that  we  use  include  pupils  who  finished  primary  education  in  the  academic  years  2000/2001  to 
2003/2004, entered secondary school in 2001/2002 to 2004/2005, and sat for their KS3 exams in 
2003/2004 to 2006/2007. We use information on these four cohorts because this is the only time-
window where we can identify the secondary school where pupils start their secondary education and 
not only the one where they take their KS3 tests. This is crucial to our analysis since we want to 
measure peer exposure at the beginning of secondary schooling (in 7
th grade), and not after three years 
(in 9
th grade). The data also allows us to gather information about the primary schools where pupils 
took the KS2 exams, which implies that we are able to single-out secondary schoolmates that are new 
peers from those who instead came from the same primary school (i.e. old peers).  
Using this set of information we construct a variety of peer quality measures based on pupil 
achievements  at  KS2  in  the  three  core  subjects.  In  order  to  do  so,  we  use  the  KS2  test  scores, 
separately by subject and cohort, to assign each pupil to a percentile in the cohort-specific and subject-
specific national distribution. We then go on to create three separate measures of peer quality. First, 
we compute the average attainments of peers in the grade at school. Next, we create two measures that 
capture peer effects coming from the „very best‟ and the „very worst‟ students at school, namely the 
fraction of peers in the grade below the 5
th percentile or above the 95
th percentile of the cohort-specific 
national distribution of KS2 test scores. 
We have imposed a set of restrictions on our data in order to obtain a balanced panel of pupil 
information in a balanced panel of schools. First, we have selected only pupils with valid information 
on their KS2 and KS3 tests for whom we can also match individual background characteristics and the 
identity of the school where they start their secondary education using PLSAC. Given the quality of 
our data, this implies that we drop less than 2.5% of our initial data. Next, we have focused on schools 
that are open in every year of our analysis, and have further dropped secondary schools that have a 
year-on-year change of entry-cohort size of more than 75% or enrolments below 15 pupils. While the 
former  restriction  excludes  schools  that  were  exposed  to  large  shocks  that  might  confound  our 
analysis, the latter excludes schools that are either extremely small or had many missing observations. 
These restrictions imply that we lose less than 2.5% of our initial observations. We have also excluded 
selective schools (e.g. Grammar schools) from our analysis, as these can actively choose their pupils 
based on their ability (about 8% of our original sample). Furthermore, we drop schools where the 
fractions of pupils below the 5
th percentile or above the 95
th percentile of the cohort-specific KS2  
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national distribution do not exhibit any variation over the four years under analysis. These restrictions 
predominantly  trim  schools  that  have  no  students  in  either  the  top  or  bottom  5%  of  the  ability 
distribution in any year in any subject, and would thus not contribute to the identification of peer 
effects. Since these constraints imply that we drop about 10% of the sample, we checked that our main 
results  are  not  affected  when  we  omit  these  restrictions.  Finally,  we  focus  on  the  50%  smallest 
secondary schools in England, with a maximum 7
th grade cohort-size of 180 students, and 135 grade-7 
students on average. Our final dataset includes a balanced panel of approximately 500,000 pupils for 
whom we can observe complete information in terms of KS2 and KS3 test scores, individual and 
family background characteristics, and both primary and secondary school level information from age-
11 to age-14. In the next section, we present some descriptive statistics. 
4.3.  Some descriptive statistics 
In Column (1) of Table 1 we present descriptive statistics for the main variables of interest for the 
sample of „regular‟ students, defined as the set of pupils with age-11 test scores in the three subjects 
above the 5
th percentile and below the 95
th percentile of KS2 test score distribution. In the same table, 
we also presents descriptive statistics for pupils in either the top 5% or bottom 5% tails of the ability 
distribution – which we also label as „treatments‟. The regression analysis that follows is mostly based 
on the sample that includes all students, i.e. „regular‟ pupils and the „treatments‟. However, we will 
also discuss some results based on the sample that excludes the top and bottom 5% pupils to keep the 
distinction between treated students and pupils that form our treatments clean. 
In the top panel of the table we describe pupils‟ test scores at KS2 and KS3. Unsurprisingly, the 
first column shows that test score percentiles of regular students are centered just below 50, for all 
subjects and at both Key Stages. The correlations of pupils‟ KS2 test scores across subjects are 0.59 
for English and Mathematics; 0.62 for English and Science; and 0.68 for Science and Mathematics. At 
KS3 these correlations increase to 0.64, 0.68 and 0.80, respectively. Appendix Table 1 further shows 
that the within-pupil variations of KS2 and KS3 test scores across the three subjects are respectively 
11.8 and 10.9. This provides evidence that test scores are not perfectly correlated across subjects for 
the same student, although they tend to be more closely associated in Science and Mathematics, in 
particular at KS3. 
The remaining two columns of the table illustrate how pupils with at least one subject in either 
the  top  5%  or  the  bottom  5%  of  the  ability  distributions  score  at  their  KS2  and  KS3  tests.  By 
construction, pupils in top 5% of the KS2 test score distribution perform much better than any other 
pupil in their KS2 exams, while the opposite is true for pupils in the bottom 5% tail. We get a very 
similar picture if we look at pupils‟ KS2 test scores in one subject (e.g. English) imposing that at least 
one of the other two subjects (e.g. Mathematics or Science) is above the 95
th percentile or below the 5
th 
percentile of the test score distribution. More interestingly, this stark ranking is not changed when we 
look at KS3 test scores, for all subjects, with little evidence of  significant mean reversion in the 
achievements of very good and very bad peers between age-11 and age-14. To further substantiate this  
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point, we have analyzed the KS3 percentile ranking of pupils in the top and bottom 5% of the KS2 
achievement distribution. For all subjects, about 80% of the pupils ranking in the bottom 5% at KS2, 
still rank in the bottom 20% of the KS3 distribution, with approximately 70% of them concentrated in 
the bottom 10%. At the opposite extreme, around 80% of pupils ranking in the top 5% at KS2 remains 
in the top 20% of the KS3 achievement distribution, with the vast majority still scoring in the top 10%. 
In a nutshell, our „good‟ and „bad‟ peers are persistently among the brightest and worst performers. 
The second panel of Table 1 presents more information on pupil background characteristics. The 
figures  in  the  first  column  reveal  that  the  „regular‟  sample  is  representative  of  the  population  of 
English secondary school pupils. On the other hand, pupils with at least one subject in the bottom 5% 
are less likely to have English as their first language and more likely to be eligible for free school 
meals (a proxy for family income). The opposite is true for pupils with at least one subject in the top 
5%. However, the differences in family background are much less evident than those in terms of 
academic ability presented in Panel A. Peer ability measures defined in terms of pupil background 
would therefore severely underestimate differences in peers‟ academic quality.
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Finally, in Panel C we describe some school characteristics for the various sub-groups. Around 
63% of all pupils attend Community schools, while about 25% of the pupils attend a religiously 
affiliated  state-school.  This  figure  is  higher  than  in  the  national  data  (at  around  16%),  because 
religious schools tend to be of the smaller type that we sample here. Pupils with at least one subject in 
the top 5% of the ability distribution are less likely to attend a Community school, and more likely to 
be in a faith school, than pupils in the central part of the ability distribution and students with at least 
one subject in the bottom 5%. However, these differences are not remarkable. 
In Table 2, we present some descriptive statistics of our „treatments‟ for the new peers only. The 
top figures show that the median share of new schoolmates is 84%, although the distribution of new 
peers at school is right-skewed, with many more pupils facing almost 100% new schoolmates than at 
most 1%. The 25
th and 75
th percentiles of the distribution of new peers are 67% and 94%, respectively. 
Next,  Panel  A  summarizes  average  peer  quality  (by-construction  close  to  fifty  for  all  subjects), 
whereas Panels B and C present descriptive statistics for our proxies for „good‟ and „bad‟ peers. Note 
that all peer quality measures display quite a wide range of variation, although this mainly captures 
differences  across  schools.  Nevertheless,  Appendix  Table  1  shows  that  the  same  pupil  faces 
considerably different fractions of academically bright and weak students across different subjects, as 
well as a significant amount of within-pupil across-subject dispersion in average peer‟s age-11 test 
scores. This is the variation that our pupil fixed-effect regressions exploit to identify the effect of peer 
quality. Finally, note that the incidence of pupils with at least one subject in the top 5% or the bottom 
                                                 
13 Note that pupils in the bottom 5% of the KS2 distribution are more likely to change school between 7
th and 9
th 
grade. Additional results (not tabulated) also show that „regular‟ students are less likely to change school during 
this period if they face more „good‟ peers as well as more „bad‟ peers. This advocates our use of peer quality 
measures based on schools attended in 7
th grade. On the other hand, we are not concerned with the overall effect 
of school mobility on pupil achievements as this is controlled for in our pupil fixed-effect strategy.  
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5% of the KS2 distribution is not concentrated in just a handful of schools: only four schools in our 
sample do not have at least some „good‟ and some „bad‟ peers in a given year. Moreover, the median, 
10
th and 90
th percentiles of the school-by-year distribution of the percentage of very bright and very 
poor peers are respectively: 9.7%, 3.9% and 17.3%; and 7.3%, 2.6% and 15.1%. 
5.  Results  
5.1.   Effects of peers’ ability: main findings 
We begin the discussion of our results by presenting estimates of the impact of the peer quality on 
pupil outcomes at KS3 and controlling for any potential subject-specific sorting by including lagged 
test scores as discussed in Section 3.2. Results are reported in Panel A of Table 3. Columns (1) and (2) 
present OLS and within-pupil estimates of the effect of average peer quality. Columns (3) and (4) 
present OLS and within-pupil estimates of the effect of the percentage of bottom 5% peers, while 
Columns (5) and (6) present estimates of the effect of the percentage of top 5% peers. These estimates 
come from a variety of specifications, which differ in the way they control for lagged test scores. In 
the first two rows, we report estimates unconditional on age-11 achievements, while the third row 
presents estimates where we include pupils‟ own KS2 attainment in the same subject in interaction 
with subject dummies. Finally, in the last row of Panel A, we include pupils‟ own KS2 test scores in 
the same-subject and cross-subject in interaction with subject effects. Note that the results in the first 
row are obtained from different regressions, where only one of the three peer quality measures is used 
as treatment. Results in the remaining rows instead come from regressions that include all treatments 
together. Finally, standard errors are clustered at the school level to allow for any degree of correlation 
in pupils‟ residuals across subjects, within schools and over cohorts. 
Starting from the first two rows, OLS estimates in Column (1) show a high and positive partial 
correlation between average peer quality and students‟ KS3 achievements. The estimated coefficient is 
approximately 0.30 when only the average peer quality is entered in the regression, and drops to 0.12 
when the quality of top and bottom peers is further appended to the specification. This suggests that 
the tails of the ability distribution capture most of the relation between average peer ability and KS3 
achievements.
14 A similar picture emerges when looking at Columns (3) and (5), which display OLS 
estimates of the effect of top 5% and bottom 5% peers at schools: the estimated coefficient on „good‟ 
peers  is  large  –  between  0.83  and  0.46  –  while  the  estimated  association  with  „bad‟  peers  is 
significantly negative and in the order of -0.8/-1.1.  
A markedly different picture emerges when looking at Columns (2), (4) and (6), where we report 
results from specifications that include pupil fixed-effects. Column (2) shows that the positive impact 
of  average  peer  quality  completely  disappears  upon  inclusion  of  pupil  fixed-effects.  This  is  now 
estimated to be at most 0.01, and not statistically different from zero. Similarly, Column (6) shows that 
                                                 
14 To avoid double counting, we have also computed and experimented with measures of the average peer 
quality that exclude the top 5% and bottom 5% tails, and have come to similar conclusions.  
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the within-pupil estimates of the effect of the most academically talented peers are positive, but small 
and not statistically different from zero. Only the effect of the bottom 5% peers remains sizeable and 
significantly negative after including pupil fixed-effects. As shown in Column (4), this is estimated to 
be -0.135 in the first row, and -0.124 in the second row, where all three treatments are included 
simultaneously. Focusing on the latter, this is approximately one sixth of the corresponding OLS 
estimate. Although one reason why within-pupil estimates of peer effects might be smaller than OLS 
is because they net out overall effects that might arise through cross-subject interactions, this dramatic 
reduction is more likely due to the fact that within-pupil estimates control for pupil own unobserved 
average ability, unmeasured background characteristics and school-by-cohort unobserved effects.  
In the last two rows of Panel A of Table 3, we present estimates from specifications where we 
include lagged test scores as a way to control for any residual pupil subject-specific ability and sorting. 
Comparing the second row to the third and fourth, we find that the OLS estimates of ability peer 
effects are now between 10% and 50% smaller than before. However, even when controlling for 
lagged test scores in the OLS specification in a very flexible way as in Row (4), we are unable to 
reduce our estimates of the effect of peers‟ quality to values close to the within-pupil estimates. This 
strongly  speaks  in  favor  of  pupil  fixed-effects  regressions.  On  the  other  hand,  the  within-pupil 
estimates are essentially unaffected by the inclusion of pupils‟ age-11 test scores. The effect of the 
average peer quality remains small and insignificant, while the effect of the share of bright students 
increases  from  around  0.02  to  approximately  0.04,  but  remains  clearly  insignificant.  More 
interestingly, the effect of the bottom 5% peers only marginally drops to -0.120 from -0.124, when we 
include  KS2  attainment.
15,16  This  finding  is  particularly  reassuring  especially  considering  that  the 
same-subject lagged test score enters the within-pupil regressions with a large coefficient (of about 
0.35 for example in the third row), and is highly significant.  
In  fact,  the  reason  why  the  inclusion  of  lagged  test  scores  hardly  affects  the  within-pupil 
estimates  of  effect  of  peer  quality  is  that  there  is  neither  a  sizeable  nor  a  significant  correlation 
between the within-student across-subject variation in own age-11 achievements and the variation in 
peers‟ ability across subjects. Stated differently, conditional on pupil fixed-effects, peer quality in one 
subject  is  balanced  with  respect  to  pupils‟  own  age-11  test  scores  in  that  subject.  We  show  this 
formally in Panel B of Table 3, where we present results from regressions of one pupil‟s own age-11 
test scores on the three peer quality measures (controlling for subject and subject-by-gender dummies). 
We  label  this  regression  analysis  a  „placebo-type‟  test  since  we  expect  to  find  no  relation  if  the 
                                                 
15 We have also tried some specifications where we further include age-7 test scores. These are available for only 
three out of out four cohorts, Moreover, students are not tested in science at age 7 and we had to impute test 
scores in this subject using the average between mathematics and English. Even then, our findings were fully 
confirmed, with no effects coming from average peer quality and top students, and strong negative (same size) 
effects from the fraction of bottom 5% peers. 
16  Note  that  the  negative  effect  of  „bad‟  peers  is  slightly  larger  if  we  focus  on  students  with  a  very  high 
percentage of new peers at school. For example, considering the sample of pupils with at least 97% new peers 
(corresponding to the 10% percent of students with the largest fraction of new peers) we still find that only the 
fraction of bad peers has a significant impact, now estimated to be at -0.133 (s.e. 0.046).  
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variation in our „treatments‟ is as good as random conditional on pupil fixed-effects. Columns (1), (3) 
and  (5)  present  OLS  estimates,  whereas  Columns  (2),  (4)  and  (6)  come  from  the  within-pupil 
specification detailed in Equation (1). OLS results show that unconditional on pupil fixed-effects there 
is a large and significant degree of sorting. For example, the association between pupils‟ own age-11 
test scores and the fraction of bottom 5% peers is -0.40 and strongly significant. However, when we 
include pupil fixed-effects this relation drops by a factor of twenty to -0.021 (with a standard error of 
0.017), and is not significant at conventional levels. Similarly, the within-pupil estimate in Column (2) 
shows that there is no significant relation between students‟ prior achievement in a given subject and 
the average peer quality in that subject. The estimated effect is as small as 0.012 and not statistically 
significant. Finally, the OLS estimate for the fraction of top 5% peers is 0.391 with a small standard 
error (0.017), suggesting large positive sorting. However, adding pupil fixed-effects eliminates this 
relation and reverses the sign of the placebo-test estimate to -0.034. Even though this coefficient is 
marginally significant, we regard it as spurious correlation. In fact, as we noted above, the estimated 
effect of the top 5% peers is not significantly changed when adding lagged test scores as controls. All 
in all, these findings suggest that within-pupil specifications effectively take care of the endogenous 
sorting  of  pupils  and  their  peers  into  secondary  education,  and  that  any  residual  subject-specific 
sorting is too small to confound out estimates. 
Before moving on, note that the results so far come from regressions that include the top 5% and 
bottom 5% peers in the sample that we use to estimate the peer effects. However, as discussed above, 
an alternative would be to exclude the „good‟ and „bad‟ peers from the estimation sample in order to 
keep the distinction between treated pupils (i.e. the „regular‟ students of Table 1) and „treatments‟ 
clean. If we follow this approach, we find very similar results: our estimates of the effect of average 
peer quality and the top 5% peer are both small and insignificant at 0.000 (s.e. 0.014) and 0.054 (s.e. 
0.040), respectively. On the other hand, the effect of the bottom 5% peers is a significant -0.128 (s.e. 
0.047), slightly larger than our baseline estimate in Row (4), Panel A, Table 3.
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5.2   Robustness to potential threats to identification  
In this section, we present a set of robustness checks that support the causal interpretation of our 
findings. Results are presented in Panel A of Table 4. Estimates come from within-pupil specifications 
that control for same- and cross-subject KS2 test scores interacted with subject specific dummies as 
described by Equation (2). Further details are provided in the note to the table. 
As discussed in Section 4, parental choice is the guiding principle that education authorities 
should  adopt  when  ranking  pupils‟  applications  to  schools.  However,  when  schools  are  over-
subscribed, they have some discretion in prioritizing pupils for admissions and once concern is that 
                                                 
17  Regarding  the  effect  of  average  peer  quality  being  zero,  we  further  looked  into  this  issue  by  using  the 
specification of Row (4), but including in the regression only the average peer quality variable. When doing this, 
the within-pupil estimates goes from 0.002 to 0.012 (but remains insignificant). This suggests that the reason 
why average peer quality does not have a sizeable impact when we include proxies for peers in the ability tails is 
that these capture most of the relevant „empirical action‟, and not because we estimate net peer effects.  
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they might covertly select students with characteristics that are particularly suited to their teaching 
expertise and other infrastructures specific to one of the three core subjects under analysis. Note that 
we are not concerned with potential selection based on pupil overall ability, as this is fully taken care 
of in the within-pupil specifications. To allay these concerns, Row (1) in Panel A of Table 4 presents 
results  obtained  by  excluding  over-subscribed  schools  (accounting  for  approximately  35%  of  the 
pupils  in  our  baseline  sample).  The  estimates  of  the  effects  of  peers‟  ability  are similar  to  those 
obtained before, in particular for the impact of the fraction of bottom 5% peers, which is now slightly 
larger at -0.131 (s.e. 0.048). Further results (not tabulated, but available upon requests) also show that 
our findings are similar for secular schools and schools with a religious affiliation. All in all, this 
suggests that neither school-side selection of pupils with unobservables potentially correlated with 
ability in a given subject, nor other school institutional features drive our main results.  
A second robustness check assesses whether parental choice of schools with an „expertise‟ in a 
given subject might confound our estimates. To do so, we examine whether our findings are driven by 
sorting of students who attend a school with peers that excel in the same subject. More precisely, we 
identify two groups of students: (i) those who excel in subject q (say English) and go to schools where, 
on average over the four years of our analysis, new peers also excel in that subject; and (ii) those who 
excel in subject q (say, again, English) and go to schools where, on average, new peers excel in a 
different subject (either Mathematics or Science). We label these two groups as „sorted‟ and „mixed‟ 
pupils,  respectively.
18  We  then  re-run  our  analysis  including  only  „mixed‟  students  to  understand 
whether our results are driven by sorting of pupils with unobservables that are conducive to excellence 
in subject q (e.g. English) in the same school. Results from this exercise are reported in Row (2) of 
Panel A of the table and support our previous findings. Even when considering only „mixed‟ pupils, 
we find no significant effects from peers of average quality and the fraction of new peers in the top 5% 
of  the  ability  distribution.  On  the  other  hand,  we  still  find  a  sizeable  and  statistically  significant 
negative effect from the bottom 5% peers. The estimated impact is -0.120 (s.e. 0.046), which fully 
confirms our results so far.  
To further assess the robustness of our findings against the possibility of subject-specific sorting, 
we perform two additional validity checks based on focusing on a subset of students with restricted 
„school choice‟. To carry out the first exercise, we exploit detailed geographical information on pupils‟ 
place of residence and location of the schools they attend, namely geo-coded postcodes with one-
meter-precision geographical coordinates. Using this data, we start by calculating for each postcode of 
residence the median distance that pupils living in that postcode travel in order to attend their school. 
In our sample, this median home-school travel distance is on average 3km (or 1.9miles). For every 
pupil, we then count the number of schools other than the one currently attended that are within the 
median home-school travel distance for the postcode where he/she lives. We label this set of schools 
                                                 
18 Note that peers‟ excellence in a subject is defined using new peers‟ average KS2 test scores. Our results are 
unaffected if we use the fraction of new peers in the top 5% of the ability distribution.  
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the pupil‟s „choice set‟ (a similar approach was used in Gibbons et al., 2008). In our first robustness 
check, we focus on pupils with only one school within their „choice set‟ and re-estimate Equation (2). 
This sub-group includes about 50 percent of the postcodes of residence in our sample, and 72 percent 
of the students. Results are reported in Row (3) of Table 4 and confirm our previous findings. The 
effect of bad peers is slightly smaller than previously found, but still sizeable at -0.099 and statistically 
significant. On the other hand, neither the average peer quality nor the fraction of peers in the top 5% 
of the ability distribution has a significant effect on students‟ age-14 attainments. 
In our second robustness check, we take a coarser, but simpler approach and focus on students 
that have a limited number of schools within their Local Education Authority (LEA) of residence. As 
discussed in Burgess and Slater (2006), cross-LEAs school attendance is not predominant at secondary 
level (in particular outside London), and there is a strong presumption that pupils should attend a 
school within their LEA. Exploiting this intuition, we concentrate on students living in LEAs with the 
most restricted choice set and estimate Equation (2) on this subset of pupils. In particular, we focus on 
LEAs  with  less  than  12  schools,  which  represent  the  median  of  the  secondary  school-per-LEA 
distribution. This sample includes approximately 140,000 students, or 28 percent of the full sample. 
Results from this exercise are reported in Row (4) of Table 4 and confirm the picture gathered so far. 
We still find that the average peer quality and the fraction of „good‟ peers do not have significant 
effects.  On  the  other  hand,  the  impact  of  the  fraction  of  peers  in  the  bottom  5%  of  the  ability 
distribution is larger than before at -0.151 and significant. Note that our results are not affected if we 
exclude all the London LEAs. All in all, these additional results reinforce the claim that our findings 
are causal and not driven by subject-specific sorting.  
One  final  concern  is  that  although  the  pupil  fixed-effects  account  for  school-by-cohort 
unobserved  shocks  they  do  not  control  for  subject-specific  school  unobservables  and  therefore 
estimates of the effect of peers‟ quality might by confounded by other subject-specific school features, 
such as teachers‟ quality. As already stated, in order to minimize these concerns we have excluded 
from our sample schools with a stated „specialism‟ in a given subject. To further allay these concerns, 
in Row (5) of Table 4, we include in our specifications school-by-subject fixed-effects – on top of 
pupil fixed-effects – to control for subject-specific school unobservables which are persistent over 
time.  We  estimate  this  specification  using  only  the  first  and  last  cohorts  in  our  data  in  order  to 
maximize the variation over time that we can exploit to estimate peer effects. This approach is very 
„demanding‟ since the identification lives off the variation in the „spread‟ of pupils‟ KS3 test scores 
and  peer  quality  measures  across  subject  over-time  within-schools,  and  this  is  not  significantly 
widening or vanishing. This is perhaps not surprising given that we are considering standardized test 
scores and that schools‟ composition does not dramatically fluctuates over four years. Even then, our 
results  broadly  support  our  previous  conclusions.  The  effect  of  the  average  peer  quality  is  still 
estimated to be small positive and insignificant, whereas the effect of the top 5% peers turns small 
negative  at  -0.019,  but  clearly  insignificant.  On  the  other  hand,  the  effect  of  „bad‟  peers  is  still  
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estimated to be a significant -0.086 (s.e. 0.019), only around 30% smaller than our main estimates.
19 
We believe this reduction in size has more to do with attenuation biases, which are further exacerbated 
when adding an extra layer of fixed-effects (i.e. 3570 school-by-subject fixed-effects), than with other 
biases induced by subject-specific school unobservable attributes. Results presented in the next section 
back this intuition. 
Before concluding, one possible concern is that our peer effect estimates might bundle together 
the effect of peers‟ ability with the effect of peers‟ background characteristics. Indeed, the descriptive 
statistics in Table 1 show that peers in the bottom 5% of the ability distribution are more likely to be 
eligible for free school meals and males, and less likely to be of White British origins; the opposite is 
true for pupils in the top 5% of the ability distribution. Nevertheless, these differences do not confound 
our estimates of ability peer effects. This is because the pupil fixed-effects regressions exploit within-
pupil across-subject variation in peers‟ quality – not the overall variation across pupils – and the 
variation in the background characteristics of top 5% and bottom 5% peers across subjects is too small 
to have any significant effect on our findings.  
5.3.   Estimates of peer effects in alternative samples 
Results presented so far focused on the 50% smallest schools in England. We argued that this is likely 
to mitigate attenuation biases arising from subject-specific tracking and the fact that we measure peer 
quality at the grade level, and not at the class level. In this section, we investigate how our results 
change when we consider some alternative samples. Results are presented in Panel B of Table 4, and 
come from within-pupil specifications as described by Equation (2). 
To begin with, in Rows (1) and (2) of Panel B, we focus on the 33% smallest secondary schools 
in England. These schools have a grade-7 pupil intake of at most 158 students, and the average grade-
7 cohort-size is 120 pupils (i.e. less than four classes of max 30/35 students). Results in the first row 
show that the effects of the average peer quality and the fraction of top 5% peers are still small and 
insignificant. On the other hand, the effect of the bottom 5% peers is around 15% larger than in our 
baseline specification at -0.141 (s.e. 0.052). Although this difference is neither large nor significant, 
this pattern suggests that our baseline estimates of the effect of „bad‟ peers might be a lower bound to 
the effect of weak peers that we would be able to estimate in the complete absence of subject-specific 
tracking. On the other hand, there is no evidence that our main findings underestimate the effect of 
average peer quality and of „good‟ peers.  
In Row (2) of Panel B, we go one step further and include in our empirical model school-by-
subject fixed-effects; this specification is comparable to the one in Row (5) of Panel A. Using this 
approach, we find that the fraction of „bad‟ peers has a negative effect of -0.115 (s.e. 0.024), which is 
                                                 
19 Note that when we include school-by-subject fixed-effects we do not cluster standard errors and simply use 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. This follows Angrist and Lavy (2009) who argue that school fixed-
effects provide an alternative to clustering and absorb most of the within-school correlation in the error term. 
Nevertheless, even considering the standard errors obtained from our benchmark specification (see Row (4) of 
Table 3), our results on the effect of the bottom 5% peers would retain their significance.   
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approximately 18% smaller than the estimate we obtain without school-by-subject effects (Row (1) of 
Panel B). This attenuation is smaller than what we found using our baseline sample, and suggests that 
the reduction in the effect of the bottom 5% peers when including school-by-subject fixed effects is 
more likely due to measurement error – more pronounced in the sample of the 50% smallest schools – 
than to other subject-specific unobservables. On the other hand, the effect of the top 5% peers is now 
0.044 and marginally significant. Note however that this estimate is above the one we obtain from the 
model that does not include school-by-subject fixed-effects. We take this as evidence that this finding 
is not robust and confirm our previous conclusion that the most academically talented peers do not 
have a significant impact on other students‟ achievements. 
To conclude this section, we investigate what happens to our results if we avoid restricting the 
sample on the basis of school size and consider all secondary school (approximately 2300 schools, 
with an average grade-7 cohort-size of 183 pupils). Our findings are reported in Row (3) of Panel B, 
and confirm that the average peer quality and the fraction of top 5% peers do not significantly affect 
students‟ age-14 attainments. On the other hand, we still find that the fraction of bottom 5% peers has 
a significant and negative effect at -0.090 (s.e. 0.032). Although this estimate is lower than in our 
baseline sample, this finding shows that the negative impact of a large number of low achievers is not 
just a feature of small schools.
20 Furthermore, the pattern of variation documented in Panel B of the 
table provides evidence that subject-specific tracking in schools is not sufficiently widely-spread to 
significantly affect our estimates. This confirms the intuition gathered in Section 4.1. However, given 
the importance of these issues, we provide further evidence in the next section.  
5.4.   Additional findings: peer effects estimates by subject-couples 
One of the underlying assumptions of our identification strategy is that peer effects are constant across 
different subjects. Although this assumption is difficult to test in our set-up, some of the studies that 
have previously investigated peer effects separately for Reading and Mathematics have found similar 
estimates (e.g. Vigdor and Nechyba, 2004; Hoxby and Weingarth, 2005), even though others have 
documented small differences across subjects (see the review in Epple and Romano, 2010). Similarly, 
there is mixed evidence about the differential impact of policy interventions and school resources on 
students‟ achievements in different subjects. See for example the discussion in Krueger (2003) in 
relation to class size.  
From a conceptual point of view, one might argue that if different subjects rely on different skill 
sets  and  peer  effects  operate  by  changing  pupils‟  skill  sets,  then  we  would  expect  to  observe 
heterogeneous results for different subjects. On the other hand, peer effects from weak students of the 
type that we document here are more likely to emerge from pupils‟ behavior disrupting the normal 
functioning of class activities (as discussed in Lazear, 2001). In this case we would not necessarily 
expect heterogeneous effects for different subjects.  
                                                 
20 Note that when using the school-by-subject fixed-effects (coupled with pupil fixed-effects) specification on 
the full sample of schools, we still find a significant impact of the bottom 5% peers, at -0.080 (s.e. 0.012).   
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To shed some light on this issue, we first ran OLS regressions separately by subjects and found 
that the estimated effects of average peer quality and „bad‟ peers are virtually the same in the three 
subjects. These estimates are presented in the On-line Appendix Table 1. On the other hand, there is 
slightly more variation in the effect of top peers across the three subjects, but the confidence intervals 
of the various estimates are largely overlapping. Even though we know OLS estimates are biased, 
these findings are informative and suggest that our assumption is not unrealistic.  
In another related check, we ran within-pupil regressions separately for couples of subjects, i.e. 
by  pooling  observations  for:  English  and  Mathematics  only;  English  and  Science  only;  and 
Mathematics and Science only. Results are presented in the On-line Appendix Table 2. Our previous 
findings for the average peer quality and the fraction of top 5% peers were confirmed for all pairs of 
subjects. On the other hand, we found stronger peer effects from students in the bottom 5% of the 
ability  distribution  coming  from  the  comparison  of  English  with  Mathematics  and  English  with 
Science, than when only pooling Mathematics and Science. For the former two couples of subjects, 
estimates of effect of „bad‟ peers were -0.142 (s.e. 0.078) and -0.179 (s.e. 0.074) respectively, whereas 
the comparison of Science and Mathematics yielded a much smaller estimate of -0.026 (s.e. 0.052). 
This pattern is perhaps unsurprising given that, as discussed in Section 4.1, the extent of subject-
specific tracking is more prevalent in secondary schools for Mathematics (50% of the schools studied 
by Kutnick et al., 2006 have ability set from 7
th grade), followed by Science (44%) and lastly by 
English (34%). As a result, when pooling the first two subjects only, students are not exposed to 
sufficient variation in peer quality to detect a significant effect.  
Although one has to be cautious in interpreting the results presented in this section, we believe 
they provide some support for our assumption that peer effects are similar across subjects. Moreover, 
these findings further show that pupil sorting based on subject-specific considerations can hardly be 
driving our results. If this were the case, then estimates of the negative effects from „bad‟ peers should 
remain strong and significant irrespective of whether we study subjects with little degree of tracking, 
as opposed to those with more significant ability setting. 
5.5  Extending the group of bottom and top peers beyond the 5% threshold    
One issue left un-assessed so far is our choice of the 5% threshold used to define „good‟ and „bad‟ 
peers. Different cut-off points could have been chosen, potentially affecting our results. In Figure 1, 
we tackle this issue by looking at whether peers in other parts of the ability distribution affect pupils‟ 
age-14  achievements.  The  figure  presents  estimates  and  95%  confidence  intervals  for  different 
measures of the bottom and top new peers. For the bottom treatment, we define the following five 
groups: bottom 5%; 5 to 10%; 10 to 15%; 15 to 20% and 20 to 25%. For the top treatment, we define 
the following five groups: top 5%; 90 to 95%; 85 to 90%; 80 to 85% and 75 to 80%.  
The figure reveals a markedly asymmetric pattern. All five bottom peer groups have a negative 
effect on other pupils, but this effect is clearly significant only for the first group, and it declines 
sharply in scale as we move away from the very bottom group. On the other hand, the effect of the top  
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peers at school is small – twice turning negative – and insignificant throughout. This suggests that our 
choice of top 5% and bottom 5% peers is not arbitrary and provide evidence that: (i) it is mainly the 
very bottom 5% of new peers that is strongly and negatively associated with pupils‟ own age 14 test 
scores, and not „bad‟ peers in other parts of the ability distribution; and (ii) there is no evidence that 
„good‟ peers in other parts of the ability distribution affect students‟ cognitive outcomes.  
To conclude this section, we provide an assessment of the magnitude of the negative effect of the 
bottom 5% peer treatment based on the estimates presented in Table 3. To do so, we begin by scaling 
it according to the minimum and maximum values of the bottom treatment variable observed in the 
data, at zero and approximately 20% respectively (see Table 2). A pupil who moves from 20% to 0% 
of the bottom quality peer group would experience an improvement in KS3 test scores of about 2.4 
percentiles, which amounts to around 9% of one standard deviation of KS3 test score distribution, or 
22% if we consider the standard deviation of the within-pupil KS3 distribution. Note that these are 
sizeable changes, as they correspond to about 20 standard deviation changes in the within-pupil peer 
quality distribution. An alternative interesting benchmark looks at the improvement in peer quality 
associated with moving from an under- to an over-subscribed school. In this case, the fraction of „bad‟ 
peers would decline by around 1.4 percentage points, which corresponds to an improvement in age-14 
attainments of around 1.5% of one standard deviation in the within-pupil KS3 distribution. 
Relative to other studies that focus on school inputs and interventions, our estimates of the effect 
of  academically  weak  peers  capture  a  medium-to-small  sized  effect.  For  example,  Lavy  (2009) 
estimates the effect of instructional time in secondary schools using the PISA 2006 data and reports an 
average effect for OECD countries of 15% of the within-pupil standard deviation of test scores across 
subjects for an additional hour of classroom instruction. These estimates imply that the ability peer 
effects that we estimate here for a 10 percentile decrease in the percentage of „bad‟ peers is just below 
the effect of an extra hour of weekly instruction time. Another comparison is to the effect size of peer 
quality estimated in Ammermueller and Pischke (2009) across-classes within-schools in six European 
countries. This study reports that one standard deviation change in student background measure of 
peer composition leads to a 17% standard deviation change in reading test scores of fourth graders. 
Finally, Bandiera et al. (2009) study class-size effects at university using a within-pupil specification 
similar to ours. Their results show that a one standard deviation change of the within-pupil class size 
distribution improves test scores by 11% of the within-pupil standard deviation of outcomes.  
6.   Allowing for Heterogeneous Effects 
6.1.   Heterogeneity by students’ gender and ability 
In this section, we test for the presence of heterogeneous effects along a number of dimensions. To 
begin with, we analyze the heterogeneity of peer effects by gender. This is particularly interesting 
given that a growing body of evidence shows that girls are more affected than boys by education  
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inputs and intervention.
21 Moreover, peer effects might work in significantly different ways for male 
and female students during secondary education, a time when both the identification with and the 
social interactions between the two genders intensify.  
We report our first set of results in Panel A of Table 5. Columns (1) and (2) focus on boys while 
Columns (3) and (4) concentrate on girls. Results come from separate regressions for male and female 
students including all three peer quality measures. However, estimates for the average peer quality are 
not tabulated since they did not reveal any significant pattern. More details about the specifications are 
provided in the note to the table.  
The results show that the effect of the bottom 5% peers is negative and significant in both gender 
groups, although it is slightly smaller for boys (at -0.108) than for girls (at -0.125). On the other hand, 
the  effect  of  the  top  5%  peers  is  slightly  negative  for  boys  at  -0.040  (s.e.  0.040),  although  not 
significant, but positive, significant and sizeable at 0.122 (s.e. 0.044) for girls. These patterns are not 
easily explained by differential subject-specific sorting for boys and girls into schools with peers of 
different  quality.  In fact, we find  a  small  negative  insignificant  relation between  the  within-pupil 
across-subject variation in age-11 achievement and the variation in the fraction of top 5% peers in 
different subjects for boys (with a coefficient of -0.025 and a standard error of 0.020), and a small 
negative borderline significant relation for girls (with coefficient of -0.040 and a standard error of 
0.020). Moreover, results unconditional on prior achievement confirm this pattern: the effect of the top 
5% peers for boys remains negative at -0.054 (s.e. 0.041), while the effect for girls is positive at 0.081 
(s.e. 0.042). Differential sorting for boys and girls can thus hardly explain our results.
22  
To shed further light on these patterns, we next study the sign and size of ability peer effects 
separately of boys and girls and in interaction with students‟ own ability. For this purpose, we stratify 
the sample into six groups according to the distribution of pupils‟ average KS2 percentiles across the 
three subjects. The percentile-ranges that define the six non-overlapping groups are as follows: below 
20 (includes the bottom 5% peers); 20-35; 35-50; 50-65; 65-80; and above 80 (includes the top 5% 
peers). The regression models now simultaneously include interaction terms of the percentages of top 
5% peers, bottom 5% peers and average peer quality (separately for old and new peers) with dummies 
indicating which of the six KS2 ability groups a pupil belongs to. The effect of KS2 achievements in 
the same- and cross-subject is controlled for by interacting pupils‟ own KS2 percentiles with the 
dummies indicating his/her rank in the ability distribution as well as subject dummies. Our findings 
                                                 
21  For  example,  Anderson  (2008)  shows  that  three  well-known  early  childhood  interventions  (namely, 
Abecedarian, Perry and the Early Training Project) had substantial short- and long-term effects on girls, but no 
effect on boys. Likewise, the Moving to Opportunity randomized evaluation of housing vouchers generated clear 
benefits for girls, with little or even adverse effects on boys (Katz et al., 2001). Some recent studies also show a 
consistent pattern of stronger female response to financial incentives in education, with the evidence coming 
from a variety of settings (see Angrist and Lavy, 2009; Angrist et al., 2009). 
22 Note that we also checked whether our results are driven by the inclusion of single-sex schools. These enroll 
approximately 5% of the boys in our sample, and around 10% of the female students. Although results obtained 
after excluding these pupils were slightly weaker, they provided a similar picture.  
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are tabulated in Panel B of Table 5.
23 Once more, estimates for the average peer quality have not been 
tabulated since they were not significant. This is consistent with Hoxby and Wiengarth (2005), and 
speaks against „linear-in-means‟ models which assume that pupil achievements are a linear function of 
the peers‟ average ability. 
For both boys and girls, we find that the effect of many „bad‟ peers at school is relatively stable 
throughout the ability distribution of regular students. The negative impact of the bottom 5% peers is 
slightly stronger for pupils in the 50
th-80
th percentile range of the ability distribution, in particular for 
girls. However, there is no evidence that these differences are statistically significant: an F-test on the 
hypothesis that all coefficients are equal accepts the null with p-values of 0.5111 for boys and 0.4513 
for girls. These results are consistent with a „bad-apple‟-type model of peer effects in which a small 
number  of  weak  students  (in  a  specific  subject)  adversely  affects  the  learning  of  all  other  pupils 
throughout the ability distribution (Lazear, 2001; Hoxby and Weingarth, 2005). 
A more heterogeneous pattern of results emerges when we focus on the effect of the top 5% 
peers. Looking at boys first, we find that the impact of the academically bright peers is negative 
although insignificant throughout the ability distribution. However, this effect is more pronounced and 
more precisely estimated (although still not significant at conventional levels) for male students with 
KS2  achievements  above  the  median  of  the  ability  distribution,  and  in  particular  in  the  top  20 
percentiles, where is stands at -0.067 (0.047). In contrast, we find that the impact of having many 
„good‟ peers at school is positive for female students throughout the ability distribution, although this 
effect  is  more  sizeable  and  statistically  significant  for  girls  in  the  bottom  half  of  the  ability 
distribution. The impact of top 5% peers becomes instead small and loses significance for the most 
talented girls, in particular for those with age-11 achievement above the 80
th percentile, where the 
estimated coefficient is small and insignificant at 0.013 (s.e. 0.050). An F-test on the hypothesis that 
all coefficients are equal rejects the null with a p-value of 0.0045. 
Since these patterns are rather unexpected, we have assessed their robustness along a number of 
directions. One mechanical explanation for why pupils who are good on average may marginally 
suffer  (boys)  or  benefit  less  (girls)  from  having  many  top  5%  peers  might  be  related  to  mean-
reversion. In general, average test scores reveal some mean reversion: pupils in the top 20% have on 
average a five-percentile deterioration in their average KS3. However, pupils within the same ability 
group, and in particular those above the 80
th percentile, should all be similarly affected by mean-
reversion irrespective of how many good peers they interact with. To shed light on this issue, we 
formally  checked  whether  belonging  to  the  top  ability  group  is  mechanically  related  to  the  KS3 
outcomes, but failed to find any evidence. In a nutshell, mean reversion cannot explain these patterns.  
Another  possible  explanation  is  based  on  „crowding-out‟  effects:  if  we  shift  the  ability 
distribution so as to have more of the very best top 5% students at school, this might crowd-out 
                                                 
23 On-line Appendix Table 3 presents results broken down by pupils‟ ability, but pooling boys and girls. Since 
most of the heterogeneity lies along the gender dimension, we do not discuss these findings here.  
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students  who  are  in  the  next  ability  groups  (65
th-80
th  and  80
th-95
th  percentiles)  from  advanced 
activities, such as Science and Mathematics „clubs‟, or special field trips because of limited space 
available in such activities. To clarify this, consider that there are usually only a limited number of 
places available in top-tier activities/clubs for each subject in each school irrespective of cohort size. 
Under this scenario, having many „good‟ peers in that subject has two competing effects for pupils in 
the top part of the ability distribution. On the one hand, there could be a positive effect that works 
either directly through interaction of students during instructional time, or indirectly via the teaching 
body (e.g. instructors‟ motivation). On the other hand, a large share of outstanding peers would reduce 
one  student‟s  chances  of  getting  into  the  top  extra-activities  and  participating  in  advanced  level 
learning, thus depressing his/her motivation and ultimately harming achievement. One implication of 
this line of reasoning is that these negative effects should be amplified in larger schools. In these 
schools the detrimental effect of having many top 5% peers might prevail, since there is potentially at 
the same time less room for interactions of pupils of different abilities and more scope for crowding-
out of good students from top-tier activities. To check for this possibility, we re-run the analysis 
displayed in the bottom panel of Table 5 on the sample that includes all schools (not just the 50% 
smallest schools). In this case, we find that the negative impact of having many top 5% peers for the 
most able boys is larger than before and significant. In particular, this effect is -0.080 (s.e. 0.038) for 
males in the 65
th-80
th percentile of the KS2 ability distribution, and -0.075 (s.e. 0.031) for boys in the 
top 20 percentiles. Consistently, we also find that the positive impact of a larger fraction of top 5% 
peers for the most able girls is smaller when using the full set of schools. This effect is only 0.003 (s.e. 
0.030) for the 20% most talented female students, and 0.027 (s.e. 0.037) for the next most able girls.  
While this evidence suggests that a crowding-out explanation of our findings might bear some 
relevance, this hypothesis alone cannot easily account for the still markedly different results for boys 
and  girls.  Alternative  more  subtle  explanations  discussed  in  the  educational  and  psychological 
literature should not be dismissed. In particular, research in these areas has highlighted marked gender 
differences in behavioral responses to settings that should lead to reciprocity, suggesting that females 
are more positively and cooperatively influenced by peers and social interactions than males (Cross 
and  Madson,  1997;  Eagly,  1978).  Additionally,  perverse  „big-fish-small-pond‟  effects  have  been 
shown to be more pronounced for males (see Marsh, 2005). Hoxby and Weingarth (2005) refer to 
these  mechanisms  as  the  „Invidious  Comparison  Model‟,  where  the  presence  of  high  performing 
students  depresses  the  performance  of  other  students  close-by  in  the  ability  distribution,  possibly 
through envy, reduced motivation and self-esteem. On the other hand, a „Shining Light‟-type model of 
peer effects – where a few outstanding students can inspire all others to raise their achievement – 
might explain the response of female students to a larger fraction of „good‟ peers (see again Hoxby  
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and Weigarth, 2005).
24 In a very recent paper, Jackson (2009) finds gender heterogeneity in peer 
effects along the same lines discussed here. 
6.2.   Heterogeneity by peers’ and students’ gender  
To conclude our investigation of gender heterogeneity, we look at whether peer effects for boys and 
girls differ according to the gender of their peers. To do so, we re-compute the fraction of top 5% and 
bottom 5% new peers separately for male and female students, and re-run regressions similar to those 
in Panel A of Table 5, but including: the fraction of top 5% boys; the fraction of bottom 5% boys; the 
fraction of top 5% girls; and the fraction of bottom 5% girls. The average quality of peers is controlled 
for, but not split along the gender dimension since we found little evidence that this matters for age-14 
test scores of boys and girls. Note that the fractions of bottom 5% and top 5% new peers are now 
computed on very small number of students. Therefore, the statistical significance of our results is less 
indicative than the sign and magnitude of the coefficients. These findings are presented in Table 6. 
Panel A tabulates results for boys, whereas Panel B deals with girls.  
Considering first results for boys (Panel A), we find that male students are similarly affected by 
„bad‟ peers of both genders. Although the point estimates are slightly different across peers‟ gender, a 
test on the equality of the two coefficients accepts the null. Moreover, the estimated effect sizes are 
very close at 0.605 and 0.687 for male and female peers, respectively. These capture the percentage 
effect of one within-pupil standard deviation change in either treatment on the within-pupil standard 
deviation in age-14 test scores. At the opposite end of the ability spectrum, we find that boys react 
negatively to a large share of academically bright male peers, with an estimated coefficient of -0.097 
(s.e.  0.057)  corresponding  to  an  effect  size  of  negative  0.827.  On  the  other  hand,  boys  are  not 
negatively affected by a large fraction of outstanding female peers: the coefficient on the share of girls 
in the top 5% of the ability distribution is small and positive (but clearly insignificant) at 0.016 (s.e. 
0.063), with an effect size of 0.143. This lends some support to explanations based on „big-fish-small-
pond‟ effects or „invidious comparison‟ mechanisms (see Marsh, 2005; and Hoxby and Weingarth, 
2005) where the presence of high performing male peers depresses the performance of other male 
students through envy, competition and reduced self-esteem. 
As for girls, the evidence suggests that they are negatively affected by academically weak peers 
of both genders, although the adverse impact of bad female peers is significantly more marked. Even 
though an F-test on the equality of the two coefficients accepts the null, the effect size of the bottom 
5% female peers – at 1.072 – is more than twice as large as the one for „bad‟ male peers – at 0.470. On 
the other hand, the coefficient on the proportion of outstanding female peers is large and significant at 
0.182 (s.e. 0.044) with an effect size of 1.978. Remarkably, this is not the case for outstanding male 
                                                 
24 Note that we also tested whether the heterogeneity in peer‟s quality affects students‟ KS3 achievements. To do 
so, we included in our models an interaction term between the fraction of top 5% and the fraction of bottom 5% 
new  peers.  Although  this  variable  enters  our  regressions  with  a  negative  sign  for  both  boys  and  girls,  the 
estimated effect is not significant. More importantly, including this term does not affect our main findings.  
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peers who exert no effect on the age-14 test score performance of female students. The estimated 
coefficient is small negative at -0.011 (s.e. 0.062), with an effect size 0.088. This is consistent with the 
economic and psychological literature (e.g. Anderson, 2008; Eagly, 1978) which shows that girls are 
more  affected  than  boys  by  education  inputs,  and  suggests  that  females  are  more  positively  and 
cooperatively influenced by peers and social interactions than males. 
6.3  Additional findings: heterogeneity by pupils’ eligibility for free school meals 
In this section, we briefly discuss the heterogeneity of ability peer effects by pupils‟ eligibility for free 
school meals (FSM), a proxy for family income. To analyze this issue, we followed the same approach 
used to look at gender differences in treatment effects. Results are not shown for space reasons, but are 
available upon request.  
Broadly speaking, results do not highlight any significant heterogeneity. Irrespective of pupils‟ 
eligibility for FSM, the fraction of „bad‟ peers has a significantly negative impact on students‟ KS3 
attainments. This is estimated to be -0.160 (s.e. 0.053) for FSM-eligible students and -0.102 (s.e. 
0.046) for pupils from richer background. On the other hand, average peer quality and the fraction of 
„good‟ peers do not have any significant effect on students‟ performance irrespective of their FSM 
status. Similarly, we find no evidence of heterogeneous effects when we allow our estimates to vary 
along the dimension of pupils‟ ability. In particular, the negative effect of bad peers is sizeable and 
significant throughout, for pupils of all aptitudes and irrespective of their FSM eligibility, except for 
students with KS2 average test scores in the 80
th-95
th percentile bracket, where the estimated impact 
remains negative, but turns insignificant. All in all, we find no evidence of heterogeneous peer effects 
along the dimension of family income. 
7.  Conclusions and Policy Implications 
In this paper, we have estimated ability peer effects in schools using data for secondary schools in 
England for four cohorts of age-14 (9
th grade) pupils and measuring peers‟ quality by their academic 
ability as recorded by test scores at age-11 (6
th grade). In order to shed some light on the nature of peer 
effects, we have estimated both the effect of average peer quality, as well as the effect of being at 
school with a high proportion of very low-ability and very high-ability pupils, on cognitive outcomes 
at age 14. Our analysis is highly relevant because of its strong external validity: our results hold true in 
the nationally representative data which includes over 90 percent of four cohorts of pupils in England 
that transit from primary school through to the third year of secondary schooling, and sit for two 
crucial standardized national tests, namely the Key Stage 2 (6
th grade) and Key Stage 3 (9
th grade). 
Additionally,  our  sample  is  large  enough  to  allow  us  to  recover  a  variety  of  estimates  about  the 
heterogeneity of our treatment effects.  
From a methodological perspective, we view our main contribution as offering a new approach to 
identification of peer effects based on within-pupil variation in performance across multiple subjects 
in a setting where peers‟ quality is also measured by the variation in their ability across subjects. By  
  29 
using student fixed-effects estimation we are simultaneously able to control for family, school-by-
cohort and other cohort-specific unobserved shocks, as well as for pupil ability that is constant across 
subjects. Our findings strongly suggests that the within-pupil specifications effectively take care of the 
sorting of pupils and their peers into secondary education, and provide reliable causal estimates of 
ability peer effects. To further support this claim, we have provided an extensive battery of robustness 
checks that lend additional credibility to the causal interpretation of our results.  
In terms of findings, our results show that a large fraction of „bad‟ peers at school as identified by 
students in the bottom 5% of the ability distribution is detrimental to pupils‟ learning. On the other 
hand, we uncover little evidence that the average peer quality and the fraction of very „good‟ peers as 
identified by students in the top 5% of the ability distribution affects the educational outcomes of 
pupils across the board. However, these findings mask a significant degree of heterogeneity along the 
gender dimension, with girls significantly benefiting from the presence of very academically bright 
peers, and boys marginally losing out.  
In more detail, our results imply that a 10 percentile decrease in the proportion of „bad‟ peers at 
school is associated with an improvement of approximately 10-11% of the standard deviation of the 
within-pupil  KS3  distribution  for  both  boys  and  girls.  On  the  other  hand,  a  10  percentage  point 
increase in the percentage of „good‟ peers would imply an improvement of approximately 10% of the 
within-pupil  standard  deviation  of  KS3  achievements,  but  only  for  girls.  This  effect  is  more 
pronounced for female students at the bottom end of the ability distribution, where a 10 percentage 
point increase in the fraction of academically talented peers corresponds to an improvement of up to 
23% of the within-pupil standard deviation of KS3 achievements. In marked contrast, male students 
stand to lose approximately 5% of the within-pupil standard deviation of KS3 from a 10 percentage 
point increase in the proportion of „good‟ peers (even though this result is not significant), and around 
9% if we consider the fraction of top 5% peers who are also males. 
These heterogeneous patterns allow us to perform two concluding thought „policy experiments‟. 
To  begin  with,  suppose  that  our  regular  students  were  exposed  to  the  following  two  treatments 
simultaneously: a reduction in the percentage of top 5% and bottom 5% new peers from 20% (the 
maximum in our data) to zero (the minimum in our data). This change can be viewed as a move 
towards class homogeneity in terms of ability, i.e. a sort of tracking. This shift would unambiguously 
improve students‟ achievements by up to 20% of the standard deviation in the within-pupil distribution 
of KS3. Interestingly, this finding is not dissimilar from Carrell et al. (2010) who provide experimental 
evidence  that  „middle  ability‟  students  assigned  to  more  homogeneous  classes  experience 
improvements in their university GPA by around 11% of a standard deviation. However, our results 
mask  some  significant  heterogeneity  along  the  gender  dimension.  Whereas  male  students‟ 
achievements unambiguously improve by up to 25% of one standard deviation, this policy experiment 
would  not  improve  female  students‟  age-14  achievements  on  average:  the  positive  impact  of  not 
interacting with academically weak peers – at 24% of a standard deviation – would be almost perfectly  
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matched by the adverse effect of reduced interactions with the „good‟ peers at -23%. Nevertheless, the 
effect  would  clearly  turn  negative  for  girls  in  the  bottom  half  of  the  ability  distribution,  and 
substantially positive for the most talented girls.  
Another policy-relevant experiment would be to simulate the effects of tracking by grouping all 
students – including the bottom 5% and top 5% – into two classes perfectly segregated along the lines 
of student‟s ability. The first group would include pupils who are above the median of the ability 
distribution,  and  the  second  those  below  the  median.  In  this  case,  the  lower  ability  group  will 
experience a doubling of the proportion of bottom 5% pupils, on average from around 4% to 8%, and a 
decline of the proportion of top 5% pupils from about 4% to zero. For the high ability class, the 
opposite will occur as the proportion of top 5% pupils doubles to about 8% and the proportion of 
bottom 5% falls to zero. These shifts would unambiguously worsen students‟ KS3 achievements in the 
low ability class, with a negative impact of about -5% of a standard deviation in the within-pupil 
distribution of KS3 for boys and -12% for girls. On the other hand, the changes experienced in the 
high ability group would improve boys‟ KS3 achievements by at most 5%, while girls would benefit 
by at least 5-6%. This policy experiment is not dissimilar from the randomized trial carried out by 
Duflo et al. (2008), who document a 14% of a standard deviation improvement in the test scores of 
pupils in primary schools in Kenya after 18 months of random assignment to homogenous „tracked‟ 
classes. Their findings hold true for boys and for girls, as well as for students assigned to the top and 
the bottom track. However, as the authors discuss in their work, these improvements are likely to arise 
because of changes in teachers‟ behavior, in particular of those assigned to the bottom tier who closely 
tailored  instruction  time  to  class  composition.  On  the  other  hand,  our  effects  mainly  arise  from 
changes in peers‟ quality across subjects holding teachers‟ effort and instruction methods constant, 
which can perhaps explain the differences in our findings.  
Do  our  results  lend  overall  support  to  tracking  of  students  by  ability?  Besides  any  equity 
consideration, we have shown that there is no simple answer to this question from an efficiency-of-
learning point of view: our results are clearly heterogeneous in relation to one pupils‟ ability and 
gender,  and  vary  according  to  the  exact  details  of  the  tracking-experiment  being  carried  out. 
Nevertheless, although we are fully aware of the difficulties of using reduced-form estimates to make 
out-of-sample policy predictions (see Carrell at al., 2010), we believe our data is rich enough – and our 
findings robust enough – to provide a solid ground for insightful interventions targeting students‟ 
ability mix as a means to improve learning standards.  
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Table 1 – Descriptive statistics: pupils‟ outcomes, pupils‟ background and school characteristics 
Variable  „Regular‟ students    At least 1 subject top 5%  At least 1 subject bottom 5% 
Panel A: Pupils’ outcomes         
KS2 percentile, English  48.9 (24.3)    87.0 (14.8)  8.5 (12.1) 
KS2 percentile, Mathematics  48.9 (24.3)    86.8 (14.1)  9.4 (13.3) 
KS2 percentile, Science  48.6 (24.3)    87.7 (13.0)  10.8 (15.0) 
KS3 percentile, English  49.0 (26.0)    81.3 (18.4)  15.4 (17.9) 
KS3 percentile, Mathematics  49.1 (25.3)    84.4 (16.3)  14.9 (17.1) 
KS3 percentile, Science  49.2 (25.5)    84.3 (16.2)  16.1 (17.7) 
         
Panel B: Pupils’ characteristics         
First language is English  0.93 (0.26)    0.95 (0.22)  0.89 (0.31) 
Eligible for free school meals  0.14 (0.35)    0.05 (0.23)  0.30 (0.46) 
Male  0.50 (0.50)    0.48 (0.50)  0.55 (0.50) 
Changed school between 7
th grade and KS3  0.20 (0.40)    0.20 (0.40)  0.22 (0.42) 
Ethnicity: White British  0.85 (0.36)    0.88 (0.32)  0.81 (0.39) 
Ethnicity: White other  0.02 (0.13)    0.02 (0.14)  0.02 (0.15) 
Ethnicity: Asian  0.05 (0.21)    0.03 (0.18)  0.07 (0.25) 
Ethnicity: Black  0.03 (0.18)    0.02 (0.12)  0.04 (0.20) 
Ethnicity: Chinese  0.00 (0.04)    0.00 (0.06)  0.00 (0.04) 
Ethnicity: Other  0.05 (0.22)    0.05 (0.21)  0.06 (0.24) 
         
Panel C: School characteristics (7
th grade)       
Community school  0.63 (0.48)    0.58 (0.49)  0.71 (0.45) 
Religiously affiliated school  0.25 (0.43)    0.28 (0.45)  0.18 (0.38) 
         
Note: The table reports means of the listed variables and standard deviation in parenthesis. The sample only includes pupils in the 50% 
smallest schools with at most 180 students in the 7
th grade cohort, and 135 7
th-grade students on average (approx. 4 classes of max 
30/35 students). The sample of „regular‟ students only includes pupils with KS2 achievement in each subject above the 5
th percentile 
and below the 95
th percentile of KS2 cohort-specific national distribution. Number of „regular‟ pupils: approximately 405,000. Number 
of pupils with at least one subject in top 5% (≥95
th percentile of KS2 cohort-specific national distribution): approximately 55,000. 
Number of pupils with at least one subject in bottom 5% (≤5
th percentile of KS2 cohort-specific national distribution): approximately 
40,000. 7
th grade refers to the first year in secondary school after transition out of primary school. KS3 refers to 9
th grade when pupils 
sit for their KS3 assessment. Community schools include only secular comprehensive state schools. Religiously affiliated schools 
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Table 2 – Descriptive statistics of treatments: average KS2 achievements and percentages of pupils in top 5% 
and bottom 5% of KS2 ability distribution – new peers only 
Variable  Mean   Std. dev.  Min  Max 
         
Percentage of new peers for pupils in 7
th grade    84.15        31.44  1  99.44 
         
Panel A: Average KS2 percentile treatment (new peers)         
Average peer achievement at KS2 in English  49.78  10.45  1   98 
Average peer achievement at KS2 in Math  48.74  9.85  1  100 
Average peer achievement at KS2 in Science  48.74  9.93  1  100 
         
Panel B: Top 5% treatment (new peers)         
Percentage, top 5% in English  3.58  3.16  0  19.55 
Percentage, top 5% in Maths  3.10  2.65  0  19.87 
Percentage, top 5% in Science  3.27  2.82  0  19.86 
         
Panel C: Bottom 5% treatment (new peers)         
Percentage, bottom 5% in English  3.52  3.05  0  19.30 
Percentage, bottom 5% in Maths  3.52  2.97  0  19.71 
Percentage, bottom 5% in Science  3.54  3.19  0  19.78 
         
Note: The table reports means of the listed variables (except for „percentage of new peers for pupils in 7
th grade‟, where it reports the 
median) and standard deviation in parenthesis. The sample only includes pupils in the 50% smallest schools with at most 180 students 
in the 7
th grade cohort, and 135 7
th-grade students on average (approx. 4 classes of max 30/35 students). Treatments measured in 7
th 
grade when students start secondary school after transition out of primary school. „New peers‟ refer to students in 7
th grade in a given 
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Table 3 – Main results: impact of peer quality on KS3 educational attainments and balancing of treatments 
  Average peer KS2  Percentage of bottom 5% pupils  Percentage of top 5% pupils  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Dependent variable is:  OLS  Within-pupil  OLS  Within-pupil  OLS  Within-pupil 
             
Panel A: Impact of peer quality on KS3 attainments             
KS3 percentiles, unconditional on KS2; treatments entered separately  0.295  




     (0.037)** 
-0.135 
     (0.044)** 
0.827 
    (0.044)** 
0.031 
 (0.036) 
             
KS3 percentiles, unconditional on KS2; all treatments together  0.117  




     (0.036)** 
-0.124 
     (0.044)** 
0.464 
   (0.040)** 
0.016 
 (0.037) 
             
KS3 percentiles, controlling for KS2 same-subject interacted with subject  
dummies; all treatments together 
0.108 




     (0.033)** 
-0.119 
     (0.044)** 
0.244  
   (0.036)** 
0.038 
 (0.037) 
             
KS3 percentiles, controlling for KS2 same- and cross-subject interacted  
with subject dummies; all treatments together 
0.099  




     (0.033)** 
-0.120 
     (0.044)** 
0.226 
   (0.035)** 
0.043  
 (0.037) 
             
Panel B: ‘Placebo-type’ test; effect of treatments on KS2 attainments              
KS2 percentiles; all treatments together  0.026 
    (0.006)** 
0.012 
(0.007) 
  -0.405 




   (0.017)** 
-0.034 
   (0.014)* 
             
Note: The table reports regression coefficients and standard errors in parenthesis from regressions of the dependent variable on the treatments. The sample only includes pupils in the 50% smallest 
schools with at most 180 students in the 7
th grade cohort, and 135 7
th-grade students on average (approx. 4 classes of max 30/35 students). Standard error clustered at the school level. **: at least 1% 
significant. The treatment effects in the first row estimated are from two different sets of regressions: one set including average peer achievement at KS2 only (Columns (1) and (2)); one set including 
the percentage of top 5% pupils and the percentage of bottom 5% pupils in the cohort only (Columns (3) to (6)). All other regressions include the three treatments together. The table displays the 
coefficients on treatments based on new peers only. All regressions control for quality of old peers and include subject and subject-by-gender dummies. Pupil characteristics listed in Table 1 controlled 
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Table 4 – Impact of peer quality on KS3 educational attainments:  
robustness to potential threats to identification and results for other samples 
  Within-pupil estimates 
  Average peer 
KS2 
Percentage of 
bottom 5% pupils 
Percentage of 
top 5% pupils 
Dependent variable is:  (2)  (4)  (6) 
       
Panel A: Robustness to potential threats to identification       





    (0.048)** 
0.061 
(0.047) 
       
KS3 percentiles, controlling for KS2: student with best subject 




     (0.046)** 
0.048 
(0.039) 
       
KS3 percentiles, controlling for KS2: students with at most one 




   (0.046)* 
0.031 
(0.037) 
       
KS3 percentiles, controlling for KS2: students in LEAs with the 




   (0.070)* 
0.000 
(0.068) 
       





     (0.019)** 
-0.019 
(0.015) 
       
Panel B: Results for other samples       





     (0.052)** 
0.035 
(0.045) 
       
KS3 percentiles, controlling for KS2: students in 33% smallest 




     (0.024)** 
0.044  
  (0.020)* 
       
KS3 percentiles, controlling for KS2: students in all schools 




      (0.032)** 
0.008 
(0.025) 
       
Note: All specifications include the same controls as in Row (4), Panel A, Table 3. Undersubscribed schools enrol approximately 65% 
of pupils in the baseline sample. Sample of pupils with different „best subject‟ from new peers in school account for approximately 
55% of the baseline sample. Sample of pupils with at most one additional school within „choice set‟ includes pupils with at most one 
additional school – besides the one currently attended – within the median home-to-school travel distance from the postcode of 
residence. Postcodes with at most one additional school represent the median of the school „choice set‟ distribution. This sample 
includes approximately 360,000 pupils. Sample of pupils in LEAs with the most restricted choice includes pupils in LEAs with less 
than 12 schools. This is the median of the school-per-LEA distribution. This sample includes approximately 140,000 students. Sample 
of pupils of pupils in the 33% smallest schools includes pupils in schools with less than 158 students in the 7
th grade cohort (average 
cohort  size:  120);  number  of  pupils:  approximately  297,000.  Sample  of  students  in  all  schools  includes  pupils  in  all  schools 
irrespective of their size; number of pupils: approximately 1,350,000. Regressions with school × subject fixed-effects only consider the 
first cohort (7
th grade in 2002) and last cohort (7
th grade in 2005). Standard error clustered at the school level, except for regressions 
with school × subject fixed effects where they are robust. **: at least 1% significant; *: at least 5% significant. 
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Table 5 – Impact of peer quality on KS3 attainments; breakdown by pupil‟s gender and ability 
    Within-pupil estimates   
  Boys only  Girls only 
Dependent variable is: 
KS3, controlling for KS2 
  Percentage of bottom 
5% pupils 
Percentage of top 
5% pupils 
  Percentage of bottom 
5% pupils 
Percentage of top 
5% pupils 
  (1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
             
Panel A: Pupils of ability pooled (overall effect)       
             
Overall effect     -0.108 
  (0.049)* 
-0.040 
  (0.041) 
  -0.125 
     (0.048)** 
0.122 
    (0.044)** 
             
Panel B: Ability blocks defined on original KS2 percentiles       
             
Effect for  
percentiles below 20 
   -0.109 
      (0.039)** 
-0.025 
 (0.038) 
  -0.149 
     (0.043)** 
 0.148 
    (0.042)** 
Effect for  
percentiles 20-35 
  -0.126 
   (0.058)* 
-0.035 
 (0.051) 




    (0.057)** 
Effect for 
percentiles 35-50 




  -0.077 
  (0.072) 
0.214 
    (0.063)** 
Effect for  
percentiles 50-65 





  -0.172  
     (0.070)** 
0.096 
(0.060) 
Effect for  
percentiles 65-80 





  -0.152 
   (0.075)* 
0.072 
(0.061) 
Effect for  
percentiles above 80 








             
F-Test: all coeff. jointly 
equal to zero (p-value) 
  0.1088  0.8480    0.0130  0.0003 
F-Test: all coefficients are 
equal (p-value) 
  0.5111  0.9416    0.4513  0.0045 
             
Note: The table reports regression coefficients and standard errors in parenthesis from regressions of the dependent variable on the 
three treatments. Treatment effects estimated from one single regression including all three treatments together. Results for average 
peer quality not reported for space reasons (none of the coefficients was significant at conventional levels). Separate regressions run 
for boys and girls. Specifications in Panel A are as in Row (4), Panel A, Table 3. Interaction terms in Panel B obtained by 
interacting the peer quality measures (separately for old and new peers) with a dummy indicating where the pupil ranks in terms of 
his/her KS2 percentiles on average across subjects. Ability blocks are defined using original KS2 percentiles computed out of the 
cohort-specific national distribution. The effect of KS2 achievement (same- and cross-subject) is controlled for semi-parametrically 
by interacting pupil KS2 percentiles with the dummies indicating the pupil‟s rank in the ability distribution (and in interaction with 
subject dummies). All specifications further include subject and subject-by-gender dummies. Number of observations for boys: 
approx. 745,000 (248,000 pupils) in 1130 schools. Number of observations for girls: approx. 735,000 (245,000 pupils) in 1150 
schools. Standard error clustered at the school level. **: at least 1% significant; *: at least 5% significant; 
§: at least 10% significant. 
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Table 6 – Impact of peer quality on KS3 attainments: treatments separately defined by pupils‟ gender  
  Within-pupil estimates 
  Percentage of bottom 5% pupils    Percentage of top 5% pupils 
  Counting male  
pupils only 
Counting female 
pupils only  
  Counting male  
pupils only 
Counting female 
pupils only  
Dependent variable is:  (1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
Panel A: Boys only           
KS3 percentiles,  














  (0.063) 
 0.143 
           
F-Test: coefficients are 
equal (p-value)  0.7205    0.1990 
F-Test: coeffs. jointly 
equal to zero (p-value)  0.0643    0.2272 
           
Panel B: Girls only           
KS3 percentiles,  






     (0.072)**
 
1.072 




     (0.061)** 
1.978 
           
F-Test: coefficients are 
equal (p-value)  0.3572    0.0319 
F-Test: coeffs. jointly 
equal to zero (p-value)  0.0270    0.0114 
           
Note: The table reports regression coefficients and standard errors in parenthesis from regressions of the dependent variable on the 
treatments. Treatment effects estimated from one single regression including all treatments. The table displays the coefficient on 
treatments based on new peers and computed separately for male and female pupils. All regressions control for the quality of old 
peers computed separately for male and female pupils, and for the average quality of new and old peers. Controls further include 
KS2 percentiles in same- and cross-subject in interaction with subject dummies included, as well as subject dummies. Effect size 
(in italics) refers to the effect of a one standard deviation change of the within-pupil distribution of peers as a percentage of the 
standard deviation of the within-pupil distribution of KS3 percentiles. Number of observations for boys: approx. 745,000 (248,000 
pupils) in 1130 schools. Number of observations for girls: approx. 735,000 (245,000 pupils) in  1150 schools. Standard error 
clustered at the school level. **: at least 1% significant; *: at least 5% significant; 
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Appendix Table 
 
Appendix Table 1 – Within and between variation in pupil test scores and treatment measures 
  All students    Sample including boys only    Sample including girls only 


















                             
KS2 percentiles  49.61  28.16  25.57  11.80    48.81  28.27  25.57  12.06    50.41  28.02  25.54  11.54 
KS3 percentiles  49.94  28.31  26.12  10.94    48.60  28.53  26.23  11.22    51.30  28.03  25.93  10.64 
                             
Average peer 
achievement at KS2 
48.76  10.08  9.45  3.50    48.69  10.08  9.47  3.48    48.82  10.08  9.44  3.52 
Percentage,  top 5%  3.32  2.89  2.56  1.34    3.29  2.87  2.56  1.30    3.44  2.92  2.57  1.38 
Percentage, bottom 
5% 
3.52  3.07  2.89  1.01    3.54  3.08  2.92  1.00    3.51  3.05  2.87  1.02 
                             
Note: The sample only includes pupils in the 50% smallest schools with at most 180 students in the 7
th grade cohort, and 135 7
th-grade students on average (approx. 4 classes of max 30/35 students). 
Number of observations: approx. 1,500,000 (500,000 pupils), in 1190 schools. Number of observations in samples of boys and girls only: approximately 745,000 (248,000 pupils) in 1130 (boys)/1150 
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Figure 1 – Treatment effects on KS3 percentiles; by different percentile cut-off points  
































































Bottom Peers Treatment C.I. C.I. Top Peers Treatment C.I. C.I.
 
 
Note: The figure plots regression coefficients and 95% confidence intervals (standard errors clustered at the school level) obtained by 
regressing pupil KS3 achievements on the following treatments: percentage of top 5% new peers; percentage of top 5-to-10% new 
peers; percentage of top 10-to15% new peers; percentage of top 15-to-20% new peers; percentage of top 20-to25% new peers; 
percentage  of  bottom  5%  new  peers;  percentage  of  bottom  5-to-10%  new  peers;  percentage  of  bottom  10-to15%  new  peers; 
percentage of bottom 15-to-20% new peers; percentage of bottom 20-to25% new peers. The regression further includes: pupil fixed-
effects; pupil KS2 achievement in same- and cross-subject interacted with subject dummies; average new and old peer quality; 
controls for top and bottom old peer quality; subject and subject-by-gender dummies. The sample only includes pupils in the 50% 
smallest schools with at most 180 students in the 7
th grade cohort, and 135 7
th-grade students on average (approx. 4 classes of max 
30/35 students). Number of observations: approx. 1,500,000 (500,000 pupils) in 1190 schools. 
 
   
  42 
On-line Appendix – Not for publication 
 
 
On-line Appendix Table 1 – OLS estimates of the impact of peer quality on KS3 educational attainments: by different subjects separately 
  Average achievement at KS2  Percentage of bottom 5% pupils  Percentage of top 5% pupils,  
Dependent variable is:  (1)    (2)    (3)   
             
KS3 percentiles, controlling for KS2 (same- and cross-subject):  
English only 
0.111 
    (0.013)** 
  -0.491  
     (0.043)** 
  0.172 
    (0.049)** 
 
             
KS3 percentiles, controlling for KS2 (same- and cross-subject): 
Math only  
0.081 
    (0.011)** 
  -0.503 
     (0.038)** 
  0.237 
    (0.044)** 
 
             
KS3 percentiles, controlling for KS2 (same- and cross-subject): 
Science only  
0.103 
    (0.014)** 
  -0.490  
     (0.042)** 
  0.241  
    (0.047)** 
 
             
Note: The table reports regression coefficients and standard errors in parenthesis from regressions of the dependent variable on the treatments. Standard error clustered at the school level. **: at least 
1% significant. All regressions include all three treatments together. The table displays the coefficients on treatments based on new peers only. All regressions control for quality of old peers, subject 
and subject-by-gender dummies and the pupil characteristics listed in Table 1. Number of observations: approx. 500,000 pupils in 1190 schools. 
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On-line Appendix Table 2 – Within pupil estimates of the impact of peer quality on KS3 educational attainments: by pairs of subjects 
  Average achievement at KS2  Percentage of bottom 5% pupils  Percentage of top 5% pupils,  
Dependent variable is:  (1)    (2)    (3)   
             
KS3 percentiles, controlling for KS2:  
English and Maths only 
 0.005 
 (0.020) 
  -0.142 
  (0.078)
§ 
   0.099 
 (0.061) 
 
             
KS3 percentiles, controlling for KS2: 
English and Science only  
 0.003 
 (0.022) 
  -0.179 
     (0.074)** 
   0.015 
 (0.064) 
 
             
KS3 percentiles, controlling for KS2: 
Maths and Science only  
-0.004 
  (0.017) 
  -0.026 
 (0.052) 
   0.013 
 (0.044) 
 
             
Note: The table reports regression coefficients and standard errors in parenthesis from regressions of the dependent variable on the treatments. Standard error clustered at the school level. All 
regressions include all three treatments together. The table displays the coefficients on treatments based on new peers only. All regressions control for quality of old peers and include subject and 
subject-by-gender dummies. Individual characteristics absorbed in the within-pupil estimation. Number of observations: approx. 1,000,000 (500,000 pupils for two subjects) in 1190 schools. **: at 
least 1% significant; *: at least 5% significant; 
§: at least 10% significant. 
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On-line Appendix Table 3 – Impact of peer quality on KS3 attainments: by pupil‟s ability 
  Within-pupil estimates 
Dependent variable is: KS3, 
controlling for KS2 
Average peer KS2  Percentage of bottom 5% 
pupils 
Percentage of top 5% pupils 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
       
Effect for percentiles below 
20 
  0.011 
  (0.011) 
-0.124 




Effect for percentiles 20-35    0.001 
  (0.017) 
-0.121 
     (0.049)** 
0.111 
  (0.045)* 
Effect for percentiles 35-50   -0.005 




  (0.052)* 
Effect for percentiles 50-65   0.005 
 (0.018) 
-0.171 
     (0.064)** 
0.038 
(0.051) 
Effect for percentiles 65-80  -0.008 
 (0.018) 
-0.148 
   (0.064)* 
0.011 
(0.048) 








       
F-Test: all coeffs. jointly 
equal to zero (p-value)  0.7588  0.0038  0.0161 
F-Test: all coefficients are 
equal (p-value)  0.9816  0.1034  0.0088 
       
Note: The table reports regression coefficients and standard errors in parenthesis from regressions of the dependent variable 
on the treatments. Treatment effects estimated from one single regression including all three treatments together. The table 
displays the coefficient on treatments based on new peers. All regressions control for the quality of old peers. Interaction 
terms obtained by interacting the peer quality measures (separately for old and new peers) with a dummy indicating where 
the pupil ranks in terms of his/her KS2 percentiles on average across subjects. Ability blocks are defined using original KS2 
percentiles computed out of the cohort-specific national distribution. The effect of KS2 achievement (same- and cross-
subject) is controlled for semi-parametrically by interacting pupil KS2 percentiles with the dummies indicating the pupil‟s 
rank in the ability distribution (and in interaction with subject dummies). Specifications further include subject and subject-
by-gender dummies. Number of observations: approximately 1,500,000 (500,000 pupils), in 1190 schools. Standard error 
clustered at the school level. **: at least 1% significant; *: at least 5% significant; 
§: at least 10% significant.  
 
 
 